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Abstract
In order to secure vital and critical information inside Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs), a security requirement of data confidentiality, authenticity
and availability should be guaranteed. The leading key management schemes
are those that employ location information to generate security credentials.
Therefore, this thesis proposes three novel location-dependent key manage-
ment schemes.
First, a novel Location-Dependent Key Management Protocol for a Single
Base Station (LKMP-SBS) is presented. As a location-dependent scheme, the
WSN zone is divided virtually into cells. Then, any event report generated
by each particular cell is signed by a new type of endorsement called a cell-
reporter signature, where cell-reporters are defined as a set of nodes selected
randomly by the BS out of the nodes located within the particular cell. This
system is analysed and proved to outperform other schemes in terms of data
security requirements. Regarding the data confidentiality, for three values of
z (1,2,3) the improvement is 95%, 90% and 85% respectively when 1000 nodes
are compromised. Furthermore, in terms of data authenticity an enhancement
of 49%, 24%, 12.5% is gained using our approach with z = 1, 2, 3 respectively
when half of all nodes are compromised. Finally, the optimum number of cell
reporters is extensively investigated related to the security requirements, it is
proven to be z =
n
2
.
The second contribution is the design of a novel Location-Dependent Key Man-
agement Protocol for Multiple Base Stations (LKMP-MBS). In this scheme,
different strategies of handling the WSN by multiple BSs is investigated. Ac-
cordingly, the optimality of the scheme is analysed in terms of the number of
cell reporters. Both data confidentiality and authenticity have been proven to
be ∝ e ∝ 1
N
. The optimum number of cell reporters had been calculated as
zopt =
n
2M
,
∑M
`=1 |z(`)opt| =
n
2M
. Moreover, the security robustness of this scheme
is analysed and proved to outperform relevant schemes in terms of data con-
fidentiality and authenticity. Furthermore, in comparison with LKMP-SBS,
the adoption of multiple base stations is shown to be significantly important
in improving the overall system security.
The third contribution is the design of the novel Mobility- Enabled, Location-
dependant Key Managment Protocol for Multiple BSs (MELKMP-MBS). This
scheme presents a key management scheme, which is capable of serving a WSN
with mobile nodes. Several types of handover are presented in order to main-
tain the mobile node service availability during its movement between two
zones in the network. Accordingly, the communication overhead of MELKMP-
MBS is analysed, simulated and compared with the overhead of other schemes.
Results show a significant improvement over other schemes in terms of han-
dover efficiency and communication over head. Furthermore, the optimality
of WSN design such as the value of N, n is investigated in terms of communi-
cation overhead in all protocols and it is shown that the optimum number of
nodes in each cell, which cause the minimum communication overhead in the
network , is n = 3
√
2N .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) came into prominence in the last decade, inspired by
the ubiquitous scenario of communicating sensors that have a limited power and relatively
small size, typically deployed in great numbers over a large area and employed to monitor
various phenomenon. WSNs have been reported as one of the most significant technologies
of the recent century. As a result, this type of network has gathered much interests
in optimising the architecture depending on different aspects. The construction of any
network and its resource limitations decide whether it is sufficient to be used in a specific
application or not. According to [7, 8] a WSN probably contains hundreds or thousands
of sensor nodes with some or all of following characteristics: Self-organization, low-power
and low cost (storage, communication and processing). All of these nodes are employed
in various applications such as military intuition and tracking, environmental monitoring
and disaster prediction. Thus, WSN is a rather large network, widespread and might
be used in critical applications. As a result, the building of a rigid security scheme is
significantly crucial to protect the communicated data.
Moreover, WSNs can be integrated with Internet of things (IoT), which is a connection
of real world physical objects with the Internet [9]. There are some topologies that have
been adopted to maintain this integration [10, 11]. However, many security issues need
to be taken into account when each integration scheme is applied [4]. One limitation
of most used schemes is the consideration of the Base station (BS) as a single point of
failure. According to [10], a possible solution is the use of multiple BSs which can offer
an improvement to the network availability in addition to load balance. However, such a
system might have some challenges such as those related to data consistency.
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One of the main areas of research within the smart city context is smart health, which
engages novel IoT initiatives to improve both quality and access to health care and smart
services in general. Smart health is a hot topic targeted by many researches, as an
instance, the study implemented by Adame, Toni, et al. in [5]. This study presents an
IoT hybrid monitoring system for health care environments which integrates RFID and
WSN technologies in a single platform providing location, status, and tracking of patients
and assets. According to literature review presented in [5], WSNs deployed in Real time
locating system (RTLS) used in health care services are a large scale networks consists of
up to thousands of nodes as shown in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Feature comparison of the main RTLS market players [5].
RTLS Technology Support Number of Nodes
RFID global solutions [12]
Barcode
UWB
Active, passive, and
semi-passive RFID (900 MHz)
Tens of thousands
Stanley Healthcare [13]
WiFi
Ultrasound (40 kHz)
Active RFID (125 kHz,
434 MHz)
Tens of thousands
Ekahau [14]
WiFi
Active RFID (2.4 GHz)
Infrared
50, 000
Awarepoint [15]
WiFi
BLE
Thousands
Centrak [16]
WiFi
Gen2IR
BLE
Active RFID (900 MHz)
Thousands
TeleTracking [17]
Infrared
Active RFID (900 MHz)
Thousands
Zebra [18]
WiFi
IEEE 802.15.4f UWB
(6.35–6.75 GHz)
Active RFID (900 MHz)
Thousands
Radianse [19]
WiFi
Active RFID (433 MHz)
Thousands
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As explained previously, securing communicated data inside WSNs is significantly crucial
due to data criticality and WSN employment in vulnerable places. However, providing
data security in a WSN has a number of challenges as described below [7]:
• The enormous number of nodes deployed usually in WSNs in comparison with tradi-
tional Ad Hoc networks which lead to the necessity of designing a security protocol
with very good scalability.
• The resources of sensor nodes deployed within any WSN are extremely limited.
Therefore, the proposed security protocol has to be energy efficient.
• WSN topology is usually dynamic where there are frequent changes for different
reasons such as: node addition/removal, node revocation and node relocation. One
key factor of any security protocol performance is measured by how it copes with
the possible changes in network topology.
• WSN sensor nodes are lacking of a global identifications in contrast to conventional
networks that consist of Internet protocol (IP) based entities. Therefore, a proposed
security protocol must not require any global identification.
According to [6], security attacks on WSNs are classified into:
• Outsider attackers: The adversary is not an element of the WSN, e.g. a jamming
attack carried out by a node that does not belong to the network and is applied on
the physical layer of sensor nodes belonging to this network.
• Insider Attacker: The adversary compromises one of the WSN nodes by using node
tampering or by making use of a software bug in the system.
In addition to conventional security threats such as replay attack, Denial of service
(DoS) and information disclosure, there are some specific attacks targeting WSNs such
as: Sybil attack, sink node attack, sinkhole attack, node replication attack, and wormhole
attack [6, 7]. The most common threats are illustrated in Table. 1.2.
3
1.3 Cell Reporters
Table 1.2: Popular Security Threats in WSNs [6,7].
Threat Layer Insider Outsider
Jamming Attack, Node Tampering Attack Physical X
Collision Attack, Exhaustion Attack,
Unfair Competition Attack
Data Link X X
Traffic Analysis, False Routing Information
Attack, Selective Forwarding Attack,Sinkhole
Attack, Sybil Attack, Wormhole Attack,
HELLO Flood Attack, Acknowledgment
Spoof Attack, Passive Wiretapping Attack
Network X
Flooding Attack, Desynchronization
Attack
Transport X
1.3 Cell Reporters
The core paradigm in this thesis is the consideration of the availability of a hidden agent
inside each group of nodes in a particular region. This agent is an ordinary node selected
randomly by BS or a group of BSs and called a ”Cell Reporter”. The selected reporter
has neither a privilege nor any extra credentials and does not informed about its new role
as a ”cell reporter” in order to prevent its identity. The main idea behind this paradigm is
to prevent any adversary from compromising a threshold number of nodes inside a region
that allow him/her to generate a fake report, launch a malicious revocation to any node,
drop packets or to participate in any type of attack. Employing cell reporters allows the
BS(s) to reveal any type of collusion between different compromised nodes in a particular
region and facilitate the process of detecting a malicious region containing one or more
compromised nodes. In order to prevent them from being compromised, the selected set
of cell reporters is changed periodically where the change frequency depends on different
aspects such as security level, application and network complexity.
1.4 Motivation and Challenges
As explained previously, a WSN is vulnerable to different types of internal and external
attacks that make use of resource limitations of sensor nodes. In addition, IoT connected
WSNs can be thwarted by a single point of failure if a single BS is used. Therefore, a
promising solution to this problem is the adoption of multiple BSs to control the network,
report requesting and report generating. Finally, plenty of recent research has focussed on
a WSN that supports mobile nodes such as those used in smart cities, urban monitoring,
border surveillance and military applications where sensor nodes are subjected to intended
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or non-intended mobility. Therefore, The motivation of this thesis is to propose and
analyse a key management scheme which tackles four important problems in the recent
key management schemes to the best of our knowledge:
1. Poor confidentiality and authenticity in the available location dependent key man-
agement schemes and their vulnerability to severe attacks [20,21]. This is addressed
in Chapter 3. Challenges: Increase these two securiy requirements without affect-
ing end-to-end security, increasing hierarchy complexity, computation and commu-
nication cost.
2. Unsuitability of schemes to be used in multiple BS WSNs and the superficiality of
tackling this problem by some recent schemes [21]. This is addressed in Chapter 4.
Challenges: Propose an approach of controlling a WSN by multiple BS, the affect
of this approach on the mehanism of selecting cell reporters and the impact of the
number of BSs on both the the system security and the optimum number of cell
reporters.
3. Lack of an affective revocation scheme for malicious nodes and cells. This is ad-
dressed in both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
4. Inability to handle node mobility in a single or multiple BS environment. Chapter
5 Challenges: Handover processes, potential increase of network overhead, the
impact of changing BS coverage’s shape and the mobile node speed.
1.5 Thesis Contribution
This thesis presents three novel contributions:
• A novel location dependent key management protocol for single BS (LKMP-SBS)
presented in Chapter 3. In this scheme, the WSN terrain is assumed to be virtu-
ally divided into square cells. Then, event reports generated by each particular cell
are signed by that cell’s reporter signature. This system is analysed and shown to
outperform other schemes in terms of data security requirements. Moreover, the
optimization of this scheme is thoroughly investigated in terms of different factors.
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• Design of a novel location dependent key management protocol for multiple BSs
(LKMP-MBS). In this scheme, different strategies of handling WSN controlled by
multiple BSs is investigated. Accordingly, the optimality of the scheme is analysed
in terms of the number of cell reporters. Moreover, the security robustness of this
scheme is analysed and shown to be outperforming other relevant schemes in terms of
data confidentiality and authenticity. Furthermore, in comparison with LKMP-SBS,
the adoption of multiple BSs is shown to be significantly important in improving
the overall system security.
• Design of a novel Mobility Enabled Location-dependant Key Managment Protocol
for Multiple BS MELKMP-MBS. This scheme presents a key management scheme
which is capable of serving a WSN with mobile nodes. Several types of handover
are presented in order to maintain the mobile node service availability during its
movement between two zones in the network. In addition, several shapes of virtual
cells, square, circular and hexagonal, are discussed. Accordingly, the communica-
tion overhead of MELKMP-MBS is analysed, simulated and compared with the
overhead of other schemes. Moreover, the design optimality in terms of communica-
tion overhead is investigated regarding the number of nodes inside each particular
cell.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The organisation of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents the technical background of
WSNs, En-route filtering process, WSN connectivity with the Internet and the importance
of employing multiple BSs in WSNs. Moreover, this Chapter also reviews related work
on Key Management Schemes and En-route Filtering. In Chapters 3,4 and 5 three novel
key management schemes are proposed, analysed and evaluated. Particularly, Chapter
3 presents a location-dependent key management scheme for a single BS WSNs. In this
Chapter, the cell reporters paradigm is introduced as a novel contribution to improve the
security of location-dependent key management schemes. Chapter 4 presents the impact
of using the same paradigm to build a location-dependent key management scheme for
multiple BS WSNs. Chapter 5 presents a mobility enabled key management scheme
from multiple BSs WSN. Moreover, this Chapter introduces a methodology of measuring
communication overhead which is dependent to measure communication overhead of all
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presented key management schemes. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the outcome of this
thesis and proposes ideas for future work.
1.7 Research Publication
The outcomes of this thesis contribution are shown in following publications:
• Fakhrey, H., Boussakta, S., Tiwari, R., Al-Mathehaji, Y. and Bystrov, A., 2015,
June. Location-dependent key management protocol for a WSN with a random
selected cell reporter. In IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC),
2015 (pp. 6300-6305). IEEE.
• Fakhrey, H., Tiwari, R., Johnston, M. and Al-Mathehaji, Y.A., 2016. The optimum
design of location-dependent key management protocol for a WSN with a random
selected cell reporter. IEEE Sensors Journal, 16(19), pp.7217-7226.
• Fakhrey, H., Johnston, M.,Tiwari, R and Angelini, F. The Optimum Design of
Location-Dependent Key Management Protocol for Multiple Sink WSN using a
Random Selected Cell Reporter. Submitted for IEEE Sensors Journal, 2017.
• Fakhrey, H., Johnston, M. and Tiwari, R. Mobility-Enabled Key management Scheme
for Multiple Sink WSN. Submitted for IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communica-
tion, 2017.
• Fakhrey, H., Johnston, M. and Tiwari, R. How to control a WSN by multiple BSs?.
Submitted for IEEE Sensors Letter, 2017.
• Fakhrey, H., Johnston, M. and Tiwari, R. Node Mobility Model in Wireless Sensor
Network. Submitted for IEEE Sensors Letter, 2017.
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Chapter 2
Background Theory and Literature
Review
This chapter presents a brief description of the related theory and gives an overview of
the related literature. This thesis focuses on key management protocols, but some other
related protocols are also presented. In addition, the challenges facing WSN integra-
tion with the Internet is presented with appropriate solutions. Finally, routing attacks
threatening WSNs area briefly described.
2.1 WSN Background
The structure of the WSN can consist of two sub-networks, a data collection network and
data distribution network as shown in Fig. 2.1. The former network elements are classified
into sensor nodes and the BS(s). The sensor nodes are limited resource devices that have a
function of measuring physical data and communicating with others nodes in the vicinity
via wireless channels [22]. On the other hand, the BS is a powerful device whose function
is the aggregation and forwarding of sensors’ data. The role of the data distribution
network is the dissemination of detected data to be available for all users. Thus, a WSN
structure has limitations in most of its components and the main communication media is
the wireless channel, but both of these specifications might be considered as weak points.
Regarding to mentioned weaknesses and other reasons, WSN may have a vulnerability
to different types of security threats. Firstly, WSN deployment in a hostile terrain causes
them to be prone to several kinds of malicious attacks .As an instance, [22] pointed out that
a WSN is vulnerable to traditional wireless network attacks such as DoS, impersonation
8
2.2 En-Route Filtering
and common attack but the potential resources limitation leads to the unsuitability of the
inherited network security techniques. Moreover, [23] pointed out that even the modified
schemes for another types of Ad hoc networks are not suitable for WSN. That increases
the demands on crucial schemes which might fulfil the WSN security requirement in spite
of their resource limitations.
2.2 En-Route Filtering
En-Route filtering can be defined as the process of checking, investigating then filtering of a
generated report in its route from the origin zone to the BS. This process is implemented
by the intermediate nodes or entities in order remove false reports within few nodes
after the generation zone. Hence, this participate in decreasing the processing overhead,
energy consumption and bandwidth exhaust. In en-route filtering, each generated report
is enclosed by signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MAC)s which are used to
authenticate the report by intermediate nodes and accordingly drop the report contains
any fault. According to [1], all en-route filtering schemes are consisting of three phases:
1. Key exchange phase: whole nodes are exchanging specific keys with relevant inter-
mediate nodes on the path between origin zone and the sink.
2. En-route filtering phase: The intermediate nodes are checking, filtering and for-
warding the reports toward the sink.
3. Sink validation phase: The BS acts as the last line of defence for the entire WSN
by collecting and filtering all reports.
According to [1], almost techniques [24–31] proposed to achieve the key exchange phase
can be classified into:
1. Symmetric Cryptography Based Key Exchange (SCBKE).
2. Asymmetric Cryptography Based Key Exchange (ASCBKE).
In most SCBKE techniques, MACs, which are derived by using symmetric keys shared
between several nodes, are used to legitimise the generated reports where each report has
to include the minimum number of valid MACs. In contrast, signatures are used by
the majority of ASCBKE techniques to verify the generated report by the BS and the
intermediate nodes. In these techniques, pre-shared credentials do not required while
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the used signatures are generated mainly by Shamir’s threshold threshold secret sharing
scheme [32] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [33].
However, the use of en route filtering might be threatened by adversaries targeting
the legitimate report by using a DoS [34], report disruption attacks [35] and selective
forwarding attack [36].
Figure 2.1: WSN structure.
Recent En-routing techniques are classified as shown in Fig. 2.2. Furthermore,
Symmetric-Based Techniques are further classified as shown in Fig. 2.3 which is an
updated taxonomy for that shown in [1]-Fig. 3
Figure 2.2: A taxonomy of En-route filtering techniques [1].
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Figure 2.3: Symmetric-based techniques.
2.3 Security Primitives
It is indispensable to secure the data flow process by maintaining specific security services
in spite of the mentioned threats. So a significant and effective tool is needed to ensure
following security services: authenticity, confidentiality, availability, integrity and non-
repudiation [1,22,39,40]. According to [22], it is crucial for sensor nodes to contain basic
security primitives in order to protect communicated data. These primitives might be used
to secure protocols creation. These primitives could be classified into three groups, hash
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primitives, Symmetric Key Cryptography (SKC) and asymmetric key cryptography. The
main challenge in the field of WSN security is the implementation of these primitives with
their full efficiency in spite of resident resource limitations. Thus, the limited resources
inside the WSNs might hinder the implementation of the principal method used to secure
its information. The SKC is suitable for providing both of the integrity and authentication
services depending on its mode of operation. [22] pointed out that [41–43] analysed deeply
the suitability of using SKC technique to secure sensors data. Through their research,
they investigate the feasibility of SKC algorithms software implementation. As a result,
they conclude that RC4 and Skipjack had less than 10 % overhead on all resources while
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) impose higher penalty (20 %). Based on these
results, they assumed mentioned SKC primitives are suitable for practical using. On
the other hand, [44] claims that some of the AES-Based hardware implementation are
not secure. [22] also assume that most of AES hardware implementation does not offer
all their functionalities. Thus, a special care is needed when a specific standard used
with hardware implementation. Hash function is used to ensure the integrity of sent
packets by adding MAC, which is unique digital fingerprint. But this primitive seems
to have some limitation in comparison with the previous primitives. As an instance,
[42] proves that SKC algorithms are approximately ten times faster than hash function
ones. Consequently, special mode of SKC operations, CBC-MAC, is used to compute
MAC instead of hash functions [22]. Asymmetric key cryptography which is also known
as Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is one of the security primitives that have some
disadvantages and advantages in terms of its implementation in WSN. It had been defined
by [45] as a form of cryptography that requires two keys, a public one, which is known
by all entities and a private key, which is kept secret by each entity. It is useful for
authentication purpose because of its property that allows each operation performed by
private key to be reversed by using public key and vice-versa. But one of limitation of
using PKC in WSN is the significant computation cost which might hinder its application
in such a limited resources network. However, one of the promising PKC primitive is
the ECC. Its properties in term of key size, energy consumption, memory cost, simplicity
and infrastructure are the best in comparison with other PKC primitives. Due to these
specifications, [22] pointed out that ECC was implemented to maintain WSN security
in software by [46, 47] and in hardware by [48] . On the other hand, PKC has been
considered by [40] as a cryptography solution that require very high energy to implement
its very difficult mathematical problems. Thus, PKC is one of the most powerful security
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primitives and ECC is the best suitable one for WSN but it still consumes more power in
comparison with SKC primitives.
2.4 Key Management System
The described primitives in the previous Section are employed to protect communication
channel between any pair of devices inside WSN form any adversary. As a result of
using these primitives, a security credentials are needed to be stored inside each node.
A key management system (KMS) must be available to handle the tasks of generation
and distribution of mentioned keys. KMS had been defined by [45] as a set of operations
and mechanisms that might be used to support the construction of keys and maintain
the keying relationships between authorized parties according to security policy. Hence,
KMS has a major importance in the maintenance of security in WSNs by establishing,
distributing and managing network keys.
The KMS in WSNs have been interested in scientific literature due to their significance.
Re-keying, which is the networks’ ability to update cryptographic keys of entire nodes
during their operation, is one of the common aspects in these different schemes. According
to [2], these schemes can be categorized depending on re-keying into: static and dynamic.
In the static key management, keys are stationary during lifetime of the network, this leads
to a significant increment on the mentioned keys. On the other hand, in the dynamic key
management schemes, cryptographic keys are refreshed during network life, so that it is
regarded as a promising key management in sensor network by [2,49,50]. They report that
such kinds of schemes are useful to dramatically improve both of network survivability
and flexibility.
2.4.1 KMS Evaluation Metrics:
Due to the importance of the security services listed previously, different problems are
challenging the design of efficient KMS. In addition to security problems inherited from
wireless networks, WSNs introduce more challenges. According to [51], these challenges
are:
1. Broadcasting nature of wireless communication.
2. Resource limitation of sensor nodes.
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3. Large density.
4. Dynamic network topology.
5. Hazardous physical attacks.
Thus, with the listed challenges, specific metrics might be useful to evaluate a par-
ticular KMS. According to the findings of [2, 52, 53], the evaluation metrics are security
metrics, efficiency metrics and flexibility metrics. They can be illustrated as follows:
• Security terminologies
a. Node revocation: The process of frustrating the actions of malicious nodes
inside the network by revoking them. It is measured by the ratio of recoverable
nodes within the network.
b. Forward secrecy: The node prevention from using old keys to generate a new
decrypted message.
c. Backward secrecy: The prevention of update node from decryption of old mes-
sages encrypted by using former keys.
d. Collusion resistance: The process of preventing recently joined and compro-
mised nodes from collaboration to capture the whole sensor network.
e. Resilience: It is an action taken from key management scheme to prevent the
adversary who compromised a specific node from affecting rest nodes in the
same network.
• Efficiency metrics: The key management scheme must not load heavily the con-
strained resources in terms of:
a. Memory: The amount of memory required to store security credentials, user
ID and trusted certificates.
b. Bandwidth: The number and size of exchanged messages between the nodes
to accomplish key generation processes, node replacement and node removal.
c. Energy: The amount of energy consumed during the key agreement process,
data transmission and reception and computational procedures required to
generate and distribute new keys.
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• Flexibility metrics: In order to design a key management technique that function
well with wide range coverage WSNs, following metrics should be available:
a. Mobility: Ability of distributing new keys to mobile nodes to allow them to
interconnect with their adjoining nodes in the new regions.
b. Scalability: The maintenance of security and efficiency features for large net-
works as optimum as small networks because of the possibility of adding or
removing a plenty of nodes during network lifetime.
c. Key connectivity: The probability of two nodes to be able to establish their
keys after re-keying process. It is essential to provide security continuity.
2.4.2 KMS Literature Review
Much research is focused on analysing available key management schemes designed for
WSNs. Mentioned studies have a different prospective to classifying the different studied
schemes. An illustration about these studies will be illustrated in the upcoming para-
graphs.
Firstly, available key management schemes have been investigated by [51]. In this sur-
vey, the mentioned schemes as of 2008 were compared and classified according to particular
considerations. Considered architecture of WSNs were “hierarchical” and “distributed”.
The author classifies key management schemes into three categories: probabilistic, deter-
ministic and hybrid key management. According to the set of metrics, both of security
properties and resource consumption were analysed for each scheme. The major conclu-
sion of this study was “no one-size-fits-all solution”.
Secondly, Zhang, et al. in [54] define the key management as the vital scheme used
to provide security in WSNs. They also present a survey of proposed key management
schemes in WSNs as of 2009. Mentioned schemes were classified according to the mech-
anism of the encryption key into: Symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid key management
schemes. They conclude that both the symmetric and asymmetric schemes have disad-
vantages, while hybrid schemes might combine the advantages of them.
Thirdly, many lightweight key management schemes were presented by [53] as alter-
natives of traditional techniques, which seem to be unsuitable in modern limited resource
networks. These techniques were reviewed in this study and evaluated according to the
same KMS evaluation metrics. They focused on a pre-distribution scheme adopted for
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homogenous WSNs. As a result, they conclude that flexibility is as important requirement
as efficiency in the evaluation of key management schemes.
Finally, it has been reported by [2] that the adoption of dynamic key management has
a significant importance because of WSNs deployment in a hostile environment. They
pointed out that plenty of schemes were proposed recently while the usage of traditional
schemes used in wire and ad-hoc networks is hindered by resource limitations. Through
this survey, a special requirement for dynamic key management schemes in sensor networks
was investigated and several evaluation metrics were introduced. Mentioned schemes were
classified in different categories as shown in Fig. 2.4.
To sum up, several studies were focusing on analysis and evaluation of recent key
management schemes. Different points of views were depended by the researcher, network
architecture, encryption mechanism, flexibility and dynamism. They conclude that it
might be impossible to find one single scheme that has a brilliant performance according
to all evaluation metrics. Consequently, they suggest several promising subjects that can
be covered in future work. Some of these notations will be highlighted in the next Sections
as a proposed project.
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In addition to the surveys described previously, some significant key management
schemes are selected to be described in detail due to their importance in this thesis.
These schemes are chosen from both distributed and centralized groups shown in Fig.
2.4:
2.4.3 Distributed KMS
1. The exclusion basis system (EBS), which is a combinatorial design of the group
key management problem, has been presented by [55]. ,The proposed schemes that
designed as EBS-based schemes assign k keys for each node out of a pool of size
p=k+m where (k>1, m<n and n is the number of nodes in the WSN). The Re-
keying process is implemented periodically or when specific node is compromised.
In this process, after a generation of replacement keys, all of them are encrypted
with the m keys that anonymous to the compromised node(s). Formerly, they are
distributed to other nodes which cooperatively have a complete knowledge about
the m keys. Based on EBS, several schemes were proposed:
• Scalable, hierarchical, efficient, location-aware and lightweight (SHELL) which
proposed by [56] with advantage of successful re-keying and collusion pre-
ventability. However, according to [2], this scheme has some of disadvantages
such as complex structure, usage of several kinds of keys and high energy con-
sumption.
• LOcalized, combinatorial keying (Lock), had been proposed by [57] with a hi-
erarchy consists of three levels: BS, cluster leader and sensor nodes. According
to [22], the normal operation of other clusters in WSNs does not affected by
node compromising in a specific cluster. This is a unique advantage in com-
parison with other dynamic key management schemes.
• The approach presented by [58] in order to enhance the collusion resistivity in
SHELL by making use of innovated batch re-keying scheme.
• MUQAMI+ which was proposed by [59] improves the WSN in the term of
scalability and flexibility by increasing the ability of each node in a particular
cluster to be a cluster head (CH).
• The system proposed by [60] which optimises the problem of collusion in com-
parison with previous schemes.
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2. Polynomial secret-sharing-based re-keying schemes (B-PCGR, C-PCGR):
• A family of pre-distribution and local collaboration-based group re-keying
(PCGR) schemes were proposed by [61] in order to solve the node compro-
mising dilemma. In such schemes, WSNs are divided into several groups where
a unique key is used by all nodes in the same group. According to this strategy,
basic-PCGR (B-PCGR) was designed, then cascaded-PCGR (C-PCGR) was
built as B-PCGR based with some differences. According to [2], this scheme
has following fragilities:
– Not suitable to be used in a dense sensor networks.
– Have a high communication cost.
– Have a probability to be affected by a DoS attack.
– Large node compromising leads to node isolation.
– Forward secrecy is not assured.
• Zhang et al in [62] enhance the PCGR by letting a CH to implement the
generation and distribution of group key for nodes in each cluster. A one way
hash function, identifier of each node and 2t-degree bivariate polynomial g (x,
y) were used by each CH to make a derivation of the new group key depending
on the threshold secret sharing scheme discussed in [32]. It was reported by [2]
that this scheme solved the node isolation problem that PCGR suffering from.
However, He et al [63] point out following weaknesses:
– The synchronization might be effected in group re-keying process during
addition of new node.
– It does not explain how to find an accurate value for t that ensures achieve-
ment of security and reliability.
– Sensor node being under control of an adversary might lead to return false
information related to new group key to the CH.
• In [64], authors exploit the characteristics of perturbation polynomial proposed
by [61] to construct a strong pairwise re-keying protocol for hierarchical WSNs
in order to thwart node compromise attacks. According to [2], this scheme
has a high robustness against compromise attacks in comparison with other
polynomial based re-keying protocols. However, it seems to be unable to revoke
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compromised node or CH. In addition, this protocol does not explain how to
establish pairwise keys between new nodes and resident ones.
3. Deterministic sequence-number-based scheme
• The energey-efficient distributed deterministic key management (EDDK) was
proposed by [65] to maintain secure establishment and maintenance to pairwise
keys and the cluster key. This scheme was proposed as an enhancement to
that in OTMK [66] which is vulnerable to attacks such as resource exhausting
and DoS. In this scheme, each node stores the pairwise keys, local cluster key
and its own public/private keys. It is constructed from three phases: key
establishment, key maintenance and data transfer, this increase its robustness
against replay, Sybil and node duplication attacks. However, this scheme might
be insufficient in WSNs with high node density; the network lifetime also might
be affected by a higher energy consumption associated with the promiscuous
listening mode. Furthermore, this scheme is possibly unable to allow a trusted
mobile node to join a network because of limitation in the neighbour table.
All previously described schemes are categorized by [2] as a distributed dynamic key
management schemes. In following, centralized dynamic key management schemes
will be discussed and explained. Its mechanism depends on usage of a single cen-
tral key controller such as a BS or a trusted third party which is responsible for
key management. In comparison with distributed dynamic key management, the
main advantage of this scheme is the impossibility for compromised sensor node
to sabotage the process of node eviction. On the other hand, the key distribution
process is much slower than that in distributed dynamic key management schemes
due to multi-hop probability [67]. Centralized schemes might be classified according
to their network structure into: flat, hierarchical and heterogeneous.
2.4.4 Centralised KMS
1. Flat network-based scheme
• KeyRev was proposed by [68] as a well-organized scheme to remove compro-
mised sensor nodes from WSNs. It assumes that each node is capable to
communicate directly to the BS. Each node has four types of keys: pairwise
key, path key, encryption key and MAC key. The lifetime of WSNs is divided
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into sessions while session key is spread to all nodes regularly by BS. The MAC
key and the encryption key are renewed with simultaneously with the session
key. KeyRev might be immune to revocation attack, however, this scheme has
following limitations [2]:
– Each new node needs to be loaded with pre-distributed key materials.
– It depends heavily on the accuracy of the scheme used to detect captured
nodes.
– There is an ability to disclose both the MAC and encryption key when the
session key is not updated.
– Ideal conditions were considered in simulating and evaluating this scheme.
– The BS was considered as a trustworthy entity.
• mKeying scheme, which was proposed by [69], is based on the authors’ previous
proposal (KeyRev) [68] . In this scheme, the BS does not assume to be trusted
so that it is proposed to solve the problem of revoking BS and sensor node. It
is one of the literatures that dealt with the assumption of multiple BS, a study
with more details in the upcoming Sections related with multiple BS.
• According to [70] an energy-efficient key management protocol (EEKM) was
proposed to be suitable for large scale WSNs. In this scheme, BS was assumed
to be strongly protected (cannot be compromised) and have an ability to send
messages to all nodes. EEKM can be considered as a regional group-oriented
re-keying strategy where the nodes are partitioned into several groups. In this
scheme, several types of keys are used, almost of them are derived from the
initial master key.
2. Hierarchical network-based schemes
• The spanning tree key management (STKM) proposed by [71] is employed to
implement re-keying process. Each node (a) has three keys: Ka,BS, KBS,a and
Kr. First two keys are shared with the BS to secure the message communication
between them while Kr is shared by all nodes of the network. Kr is refreshed
periodically by the BS during racking process. STKM has an acceptable storage
cost where each node needs to store only two keys with the BS. In addition,
STKM has a low complex communication and an ability to show resistance
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against node compromise attack. However, according to [2] this scheme have
following cons:
– There is a possibility of trusted node eviction because of its energy con-
sumption as a result of messages sent by an undetected compromised node.
– The communication overhead is proportional with the augmentation of the
network size.
– Entire data communication may be affected if global key is revealed.
– There is neither a way to estimate re-keying period nor a methodology to
detect compromised nodes.
• The location-aware dynamic session-key management for grid based WSNs
presented in [72] with a one-way hash function, two-way mutual authentication
and a symmetric encryption mechanism. The largest residual energy node in
the grid is chosen to be the CH. After each data transaction between sensor
node and a CH, both the message and sensor keys are updated. This scheme
may be more vigorous against various attacks, but have some of the drawbacks
such as high energy consumption, unavailability of compromised node revoking
and key distribution to new nodes.
3. Heterogeneous network-based schemes.
• The scheme proposed in [73] manipulates the concept of genetic algorithms
to construct a suitable key-generating function for re-keying. The proposed
network consists of three types of nodes: sink node, headers and sensors. The
responsibility of sink node is the generation of applicable functions to gen-
erate the keys and distribute them to the headers and sensor nodes. Each
key generating function is encoded as a chromosome. Those chromosomes are
selected for re-keying because of their satisfaction of the power-consumption
constraints and their relatively high fitness values. Because of using the chro-
mosomes, which consume low power, the energy consumption of this scheme
is controllable. However, the memory size of the pool used to store keys is
very large. Furthermore, it assumes that an adversary cannot compromise any
sensor node in a certain time limit.
• The authors in [74] presented an algorithm for key agreement in WSNs by mak-
ing use of PKC. The architecture of the network constitutes from a gateway and
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sensor nodes. The gateway is less resource constrained and tamper-resistant.
The gateway is assumed to have less constraint on its resources and have ability
to distinguish the nodes compromising. Sensor nodes might be aware about
their locations. A specific algorithm used to establish pairwise keys among
sensors, instead of loading whole keys of all the nodes in the vicinity. Sensor
nodes are classified into groups. The session key for each cluster is generated
by a gateway which directs it to CHs. When a node reaches its lifetime or cap-
tured/compromised, this session key can be updated. This approach might be
efficient from the storage point of view. Furthermore, it achieves both forward
and backward secrecy. However, all the session keys might be revealed in the
case of collusion between a numbers of captured nodes.
• A scheme that provides a specified forward authentication key management for
heterogeneous WSNs was proposed by [75]. The mentioned architecture con-
sists of BS and two levels of sensor nodes, high-end nodes (H-nodes) which has
functionality looks like CHs and low-end-nodes (L-nodes). While H-nodes are
assumed to be in direct communication with the BS, L-nodes are capable to
communicate with each other over H-nodes. This scheme uses the same hash
function loaded into BS, L-nodes and H-nodes. The key chain which contains
keys used for communication between H-nodes and L-nodes are mainly gener-
ated by BS. This scheme achieves accepted memory efficiency and decreases
the requirements for computations of L-nodes. Also, it supports H-nodes to
be robust against several attacks such as guessing, replay and “man in the
middle” attack.
2.4.5 Hybrid KMS
1. The random seed distribution with transitory master key (RSDTMK) proposed
in [76] is a key management scheme proposed for a WSN with an ability of node
addition. It assumes that no deployment knowledge is available in any node. RS-
DTMK might be considered as a hybrid scheme which integrates both the transitory
master key families with the random key distribution. The main idea of this scheme
is based on randomly selection of seed rings from a seed pool then each node receive
one of mentioned rings. To create a link between any two nodes, each one looks
for shared seeds between them. Consequently, a pairwise key between them is cre-
23
2.4 Key Management System
ated according to a pre-distributed master key, pseudorandom number, permutation
function and a selected mutual seeds. The main aim of this scheme is to increase
the number of possible keys in comparison with the number of seeds inside a pool.
Authors in [76] present the advantage of this scheme in comparison with different
approaches chosen from plain global key (PGK) schemes, which use same key for
each node, and full pairwise keys (FPWK), where a specific key is used for any pair
of nodes. According to this comparison, RSDTMK has advantages of greater quan-
tity of possible keys used and lower effect due to compromising of a specific quantity
of seeds. However, this research did not clarify the strategy used to revoke a com-
promised node. Moreover, the cryptography scheme used is the AES with a key of
length 128 bit which has less amount of security in comparison with other schemes.
In this thesis, all presented schemes, LKMP-SBS, LKMP-MBS and EMLKMP-MBS
are considered as hybrid schemes due to adoption of key generations by bot of nodes
and BSs in order to balance the load between two entities.
2. A multi-level dynamic key management mechanism proposed in [49] is hybrid scheme
that make use of two different level of security to protect data inside a WSN. One
of low-power-consumption SKC algorithms used to protect collected data while one
of more powerful security PKC schemes is used to protect key management process.
The network architecture assumed to be consist of sensor nodes, CHs, mobile cer-
tification authorities MCA and sink node or a BS. Through this study, advantages
of ECC over RSA were illustrated. In addition, a comparison between two SKC
algorithms (RC4 and AES) highlighted. Consequently, ECC used to protect data
communicated between sensors and MCA, which is responsible about key delivery
for any pair of nodes, while the collected data by sensors is protected by using
RC4. In contrast to other scheme, proposed one in this system is proven to more
efficient in terms of communication overhead, memory usage and resilience against
node compromising. However, the usage of UAV as an MCA seems to be infeasible
in terms of cost.
2.4.6 KMS for Multiple BSs
1. According to Wang et al., the key management protocol (mKeying) proposed in [69]
is the first key management scheme to deal with a multiple BS WSN protocol. Both
of BSs and sensor nodes are considered to be vulnerable to be compromised in
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the proposed scheme. mKeying consists of two sub-schemes: mKeyDist which is
a key distribution sub-scheme and mRevKey which is the sub-scheme proposed to
revocate security credentials from compromised node or BS. However, [21] pointed
out that the storage of keys and polynomials in mKeying requires a high space of
storage inside each node due to adoption Blundo’s theory [3]. Therefore, (mKeying)
suffers from unsuitability to be used in large-scale WSN. In addition, end-to-end
security, which is a crucial requirement, is not guaranteed by mKeying.
2. The multi BS key management protocol (MKMP) proposed by [21] is a key manage-
ment protocol designed for a WSN with multiple BSs. It is classified as a location-
dependent key management as well, as shown in the next Section. In this scheme,
the authentication process is accomplished by neighbouring nodes and BSs. It is
crucial to build a routing scheme and to plan the progress followed in case of node
compromising. This scheme has two advantages, firstly, high security resilience
against node capture attack. Secondly, end to end data security achievement. The
third advantage is the feasibility of compromised node removal without a central
authority. This scheme was proved to have a significant performance in terms men-
tioned advantages by comparison with location-dependent end-to-end data security
(LEDS) [20] and mKeying [69]schemes. However, this scheme has the same disad-
vantages as LEDS in terms of node-compromising consequences. In both approaches,
compromising a threshold amount of nodes (e) leads to an increase of the entire cell
capturing probability. Consequently, a fake report can easily be generated by the
adversary inside that cell, which would then be accepted by the BS without be-
ing dropped by intermediate nodes. Also, both schemes are challenged by a high
communication overhead caused by bidirectional multi-hop communication between
each particular cell and the BS, in addition to the computational cost caused by the
frequent derivation of authentication keys and route set-up.
It is obvious that not much research is targeting key management protocols for multiple
BS WSN. therefore, our project introduces both LKMP-MBS in Chapter 4 and MELKMP-
MBS in Chapter 3
2.4.7 Location Dependent KMS
In location-dependent security schemes, a group of n sensors in vicinity are considered
to be capable to detect the event and generate a report specifying the relative time and
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zone. Such a vital report must be validated by a group of sensors (v : 1 ≤ v ≤ n) in the
event region by using a security credentials based on the their location to prevent any
adversary from generating a fake report which exhausts the network resources and affect
the service availability. So that, any invalidated report is dropped by either a group of
intermediate nodes or by the sink itself. Depends on this scheme, plenty of schemes have
been proposed in last decade [20,21,24,77–80]:
1. The location-based resilient secrecy (LBRS) which is presented in [78] adopts two
techniques: location-binding key generation and location-guided key selection. As a
result, the usage of endorsement keys is limited to the region where the event occurs,
which leads to thwarting of attacks that globally use the credentials of compromised
nodes. However, according to [20, 21], LBRS does not satisfy the data authenticity
requirement since the compromising of n nodes inside a particular area might enable
the adversary to create a fake event in that area. Additionally, data availability is
not guaranteed where it is vulnerable to selective forwarding and report disruption
attacks.
2. The LEDS [20] is proposed as an improvement to the schemes proposed by [24,77,78].
It consider that a served terrain is divided virtually into several adequate square
cells. Depending on their position regarding the network sink, each particular node
derive three credentials, node key, cell key and authentication key. These credentials
are used to endorse every generated report to facilitate the process of filtering out
any bogus report. LEDS protocol is capable to guarantee the end-to-end security,
service availability and limited impact of node-capturing security attacks. However,
according to [21], LEDS consider a non-feasible localisation scheme to detect the
location of each node. Moreover, network scalability is dramatically affected due to
absence of a revocation strategy required to overcome the problems occurred due to
compromised nodes the limitation of network size due to lacking for a strategy of
node adding/removing. Moreover, this scheme is designed to be employed in WSN
with single sink only.
3. In order to overcome the above described flaws, multi-BS key management protocol
(MKMP) [21] had been proposed as a location-dependent key mangemnt protocol
form a multiple BS WSNs (illustrated in the previous Section).
4. The location dependent keying (LDK) approach proposed by Anjum in [79] assumes
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WSNs consist of three elements: sensor nodes (SN), anchor nodes (AN) and BS.
All ANs are assumed to have a capability of transmitting at different levels of
power. The life time of all nodes is considered to be divided into three phases:
pre-deployment phase, initialization phase and communication phase. In the first
phase, which is before node deployment, all SNs and ANs are preloaded by a single
key K. Just after depolyment, the initialization phase starts by transmitting of
beacon by ANs at each particular level of power. Each beacon include various sets
of random number (nonce) encrypted by the common key K. Based on the nonces,
received then decrypted, from the set of nearby ANs, each SN derive an updated
key. For instance, a node S which is receiving Ri beacons (n
i
1, n
i
2, ...n
i
Ri
) from
the nearby ANs transmitting at the ith level of power. Consequently, S derives Ri
updated keys (Ki1, K
i
2, · · ·KiRi) as: Kij = HK(nji ) where H is a hash function used
by every node in the network. As a result, keys derived by any particular node
will be location dependent and can be shared only with those nodes in the vicinity.
Thereafter, the derived keys will be used to secure data communication in WSN
dring the communication phase. However, LDK did not consider insider attackers
where it focuses on the outsider attack only. Moreover, LDK suffers from a high rate
of communication interference leads to a drop of 40% in packet reception ration of
MicaZ motes [80,81]. Furthermore, LDK is impractical because it requires a critical
specifications such as a specific number of ANs for each group of SNs in a particular
region. Otherwise, the protocol will failed to produce security credentials for some
nodes that do not receive any beacons and consequently have no oportuinity to
participate in WSN objectives due to lacking for updated keys.
5. In 2017, Choi et al. [80] proposes LDK+ as a key management scheme overcoming
the limitations of LDK [79]. In LDK+, authors introduce CHs as a forth element
in WSN beside SNs, ANs and BSs where CH is responsible about data aggregation
from SNs then forward them to BS. LDK+ is assumed to have two phases: key
generation and key update where the latter phase is proposed to threat the insider
attackers. In this scheme, a new method of key generation is suggested by combining
grid information in order to solve the dilemma of number of nonces insufficiency due
to communication interference. LDK+ present, by simulation, that it outperforms
LDK in terms of connectivity and compromise ratio. Moreover, LDK+ shows that
network cost can be decreased by acheiving hexagonal ANs deployment in the WSN
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rather thean square deployement presented in [79]. However, LDK+ failed to solve
the impracticality problem shown in [79] where a perssonel has to be sent to the
field in order to fix the ANs in there positions which are been morde complicated
in LDK+ in comparison with that in LDK. Moreover, the system complexity is
increased in LDK+ by increasing the number of WSN elements to be 4 rather than
3 in LDK. Finally, both LDK and LDK+ did not investigate security requirements
of confidentiality, authenticity and availability.
6. In 2017, Ferng and Nguyen proposed a new data authentication protocol, Digital Sig-
nature assisted end-to-end data authentication (DSEDA) [82], as an improvement to
their MKMP presented in [21]. In this protocol, the shape of grid cells is considered
as hexagonal and each cell assumed to be controlled by at least one CH. This new
entity is responsible about checking the legitimacy of the secret shares generated by
each node. Consequently, it requests non-participating nodes to send an alternative
shares. DSEDA employs bloom filter [83] in order to achieve communication effi-
ciency. In contrast to similar schemes [20,21,84], DSEDA introduce using of digital
signature [85] rather than the MAC technique in order to eliminates report fraud.
Accordingly, authors prove that DESDA outperforms LEDS [20], Polynomial-based
compromise-resilient en-route filtering scheme (PCREF) [84] and t-PCREF [84] in
terms of data authenticity, data availability, storage overhead, computation over-
head and communication overhead. On the other hand, PCREF and t-PCREF are
shown to be outperforming DSEDA in terms of data availability in case of report
disruption attack. However, DSEDA has several limitations such as scalability in
terms of key pool size which is proportionally related to the number of sensor nodes
inside cluster Nc. Hence, a complete key update is required in case of increasing Nc.
Moreover, DSEDA does not explain a strategy of electing CH in the network and
does not discuss the revocation procedure in case of CH failure or compromisation.
Furthermore, there is an ambiguity in terms of non-participating nodes function-
ality where nothing explained regarding how they detect the event while they did
not participate in the event. In addition, there is a great threat of insider attackers
whore are pretending such as non-participating nodes. Finally, DSEDA failed to
overcome the major drawback presented in LEDS, MKMP, PCREF and t-PCREF
which is the possibility of generating a forge report from a particular zone by only
compromising the required threshold number of nodes and the impossibility of de-
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tecting that. Such a critical threat is the main concern and this what had been
tackled in our project as will be explained in next Chapters.
2.5 WSN integration with The Internet
2.5.1 Introduction
The main function of a WSN is physical information collection from the environment
where it is positioned; these data are required to be shared for external users. The tradi-
tional WSNs share their obtained data with users via a BS which is deployed in the same
region. This might be considered as a shortcoming in the accessibility and usability of
WSN services. To overcome this limitation, mentioned services should be accessible from
external networks [86]. This might facilitate the analyses of data collected by several ap-
plications located in miscellaneous geographical locations. In addition, an operator could
control the network remotely when it became integrated with the Internet. According
to [87], such an integration might lead WSN to be one of the most important technologies
of the IoT. However, this integration will lead to plenty of security considerations. Thus,
the paradigm of WSN integration with IoT is an emerged technology that facilitates data
sharing to the users but requires some security concerns.
Figure 2.5: Categorisation of integration approaches [3].
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2.5.2 Integration Schemes
The methods followed to implement the mentioned integration vary according to the roles
of WSN main two components, sensor nodes and the BS. According to [3, 4, 88–91], in-
tegration approaches might be categorised into two different groups: stack- based and
topology based as shown in Fig .2.5. In the stack-based category, the level of integra-
tion is based on the level of similarity between their network stack. According to [88],
there are three integration approaches in the stack-based category: front-end, gateway
and transmission control protocol Internet protocol (TCP/IP) solutions. Firstly, in the
Front-End solution, a WSN is completely isolated from the Internet. A centralised de-
vice, such as a BS, is the responsible of managing all interactions between these different
networks. As an instance, [11] pointed out that the BS can be as storage for all the
data provided by sensors then share these data with external users. In such a case, the
BS traverses any queries from the Internet hosts. In the second approach, the Gateway
solution, based on presence of a centralised device (e.g. BS) to performs the same func-
tion of application layer gateway, which is translation of lower layer protocols from each
side. This scheme has been reported by [92] as an efficient way to enable both the In-
ternet and WSN to address each other to exchange the data without a truthfully direct
communication. Consequently, the WSN is still isolated from the Internet. Finally, the
TCP/IP based on using compatible set of protocols such as 6LoWPAN to completely
connect entire sensors to the Internet. As a result, a direct connection might be created
between any Internet host and any sensor [3]. Thus, depending on the match between
WSN and Internet network stack, integration between them can be provided mentioned
three schemes. The topology-based category consists of two approaches, Hybrid solution
and access point solution. First one assumes that a group of nodes with an ability of direct
Internet access are deployed inside the WSN and used by all other network to commu-
nicate with the Internet [4] as shown in Fig. 2.6.a . According to [88], mentioned nodes
might traversed by all sensor nodes in order to connect with the central system and vice
versa, consequently, they claims that these nodes might be easily mapped to a BSs. In
addition researchers in [89] claims that the redundancy and network intelligence are the
significant features if this approach. However, the process of mapping particular sensor
to perform the function of a BS is not feasible because of its limited resources and the
vital roles of BS which include security credential control, node addition/ removal beside
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Figure 2.6: a) Hybrid approach; b) Gateway approach [4].
its function of Internet connection. The second approach, access point solution, assumes
that WSN structure is inspired by wireless local area network (WLAN) star topology as
shown in Fig. 2.6.b. Hence, backbone nodes which are Internet-enabled are single hop
distance from other nodes which can connect with the Internet via single hop. This ap-
proach offers a direct connection with low latency [4] but its implementation is hindered
by the fact of sensor limited resources. Consequently, the overall cost will be significantly
increased if each Internet backbone nodes enforced by special resources. Thus, both of the
described approaches are hindered with limited resources of sensor nodes; moreover, these
approaches are applicable in static network configuration because of long time-required
to reprogram used gateways each time a new node added.
2.6 Challenges and solutions
There are different challenges that face the integration approaches in terms of several
parameters; one of these is the security issue. Potential difficulties will be explained
according to our analysis and findings of some researchers. Firstly, in the Front-End
solution, the BS functions as a representative of all the sensors and behaves as an internet
host to provide Internet functionality. In the second solution, a BS will act such as a
gateway with a responsibility of storing accountability data, it also stores a historic data
that produced by nodes. Moreover, it might act as a cache server which is similar to its role
in the first approach. Consequently, the implementation of these two approaches might
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be hindered by the fact of BS being as a single point of failure that effect entire network
when it is compromised by an adversary. Regarding to the third approach, limited storage
capacity might significantly hinders the accountability of the network [3]. In addition,
more security concerns are needed to be highlighted. [11] presents one of the solutions to
the dilemma of resources overhead occurred due to implementation of traditional security
schemes. Thus, plenty of security issue are raised when a WSN integrated with the
Internet regardless of solution used. It is clear from last two paragraphs that integration
process main challenges are sensor limited resources and BS being as single point of failure.
The shortage in sensor resources is one natural properties of WSN [40] that is difficult to
be overcome recently. On the other hand, the dependence on a BS to handle a vital role
in WSN integration to the Internet is a critical attitude because of the direct impact of its
failure on the availability of services for both sensor node and the users. As a result, usage
of multiple BSs in the WSN might advantage the integration process. However, such a
multiple BS system could be challenged by data consistency, synchronisation and message
overhead. Thus, an integration approach based on multiple BSs should be designed with
a support of core protocols consisting of novel key management scheme, secure routing
and localisation topology, secure data aggregation and an efficient time synchronisations.
Some of these challenges are addressed in our proposed scheme presented in Chapter 4
2.7 Routing attacks
• Report fabrication attack: The attacker uses the compromised nodes to inject fab-
ricated reports in the network. Such reports might increase the congestion in WSN
and lead to wrong decision or to a false alarm generation [27].
• Report disruption attack: The adversary submits a malicious report which contain
wrong MACs or signature leading to report generation disruption or dropping by
intermediate nodes [27].
• Spoofing attacks: In this attack, the adversary spoof acknowledgements generated
in almost routing techniques to indicate the node about its report delivery. This
action of spoofing is leading to disrupt nodes functionality and deceive nodes to
change their routes to sink [93].
• Sensors relocation attacks: In this attack, the adversary has a physical ability to
relocate nodes from their original position. As a result, a wrong report is generated
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due to use different location especially in the location-dependent key management
schemes.
• Black hole and selective forwarding attacks: The black hole attack occurs when an
adversary advertises lowcost routes to the network. Once nodes route via it, the
adversary can selectively forward/drop packets [94,95].
• Sybil attack: In this attack, multiple malicious nodes are created by the adversary.
Therefore, the attacker has an ability to be in different places at the same time by
presenting different IDs in the WSN. This might significantly reduce the scheme
efficiency in terms of fault tolerance and cause a negative impact on geographic
routing protocols [96,97].
• Wormhole and sinkhole attack: Such an attacker can tunnel packets through a
secret and low-latency broadband channel between two distant places and replay
them. On the other hand, the sinkhole attack can be created by convenience a
node, which is multi-hop away from the sink, that the sink is just a few nodes away
from a wormhole. Hence, all traffic from surrounding nodes are forwarded to the
wormhole [98].
• Node replication attack: This type of attacker intentionally puts replies of a compro-
mised node in many places to cause inconsistency. Like the sybil attack, the node
replication attack can enable attackers to subvert data aggregation, misbehavior
detection, and voting protocols by injecting.
• Hello flood attack: The attacker sends HELLO messages to the network in order to
convince other nodes that the attacker is a neighbour [99]. The adversary achieve
this attack by making use of his sufficient transmission power to convince far away
nodes that it is a neighbour. Therefore, it can exchange a secure data with them.
• Eavesdropping attack: In this attack, the adversary has an ability to listen to the
disseminated traffic. Such an attack can be thwarted by adopting a robust security
protocol. However, this threat might lead to any of above mentioned attacks.
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Location-Dependent Key
Management Protocol for a Single
BS WSN
3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, the Location Dependent Key Management Protocol for a Single BS WSNs
(LKMP-SBS) is described. This protocol depends on the security credentials derived
mainly from the geographical location of each sensor node within the network. The novelty
of this work is the election of a particular set of nodes inside each cell, hereafter known
as ”cell reporters”, and then nominating them as authentication entities to authenticate
any report generated by that cell. The participation of cell reporters in any event report
generated by that cell is considered as the unique endorsement of it, otherwise the report
will be dropped by the BS. In order to assess LKMP-SBS, three main aspects will be
discussed:
1. The security robustness of the LKMP-SBS in terms of data confidentiality and
authenticity.
2. The optimal number of cell reporter, hereafter denoted as z.
3. Efficiency of the LKMP-SBS as a lightweight scheme in terms of computation cost
and communication cost.
An extensive mathematical analysis is presented to investigate the first two points.
Accordingly, LKMP-SBS has been proven to outperform other existing location dependent
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schemes in terms of data confidentiality and data authenticity. In addition, both the
mathematical analysis and the simulation environment results investigate the 3rd points
as shown in Chapter 5.
3.2 System Consideration
The LKMP-SBS protocol is considered to be employed over a wide area of a smart city
of a predetermined size and shape, monitored using a large-scale WSN comprising N
limited resource nodes and a sink with unlimited resources, hereafter known as a BS
(BS). This unit is responsible for data collection, control of report verification, en-route
filtering management and origination of all data requests. The BS is considered to have
the ability to cover all sensor nodes in the monitored region as shown in Fig. 3.1. The
served region is represented as a virtual grid of N ′ cells. All cells are assumed to have
a similar number of sensor nodes that are in communication coverage of all other sensor
nodes and are able to estimate their positions using secure localization schemes, such
as [111–113]. It is also assumed that all elements in the network (nodes and BS) have a
unique public identity and a private identity.
3.3 Threat Model
The system is assumed to be secure during the bootstrapping interval, a short period
after the deployment of all elements, then the attacker is assumed to be able to capture
randomly selected nodes and compromise their security credentials. On the other hand,
the same adversary has no opportunity to compromise the BS due to its rigid security
which prevent its facilities from being compromised or cloned. When a node is compro-
mised, the attacker is assumed to be able to inject, drop, eavesdrop, alter, or retransmit
packets. However, the attacker has no access to the uncaptured nodes.
3.4 Notation and Terms
In this Chapter, the following definitions are of significant importance:
• K: An initial master key used as a seed to derive other keys
• (x0, y0): The BS location
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• ∆: The side length of each cell
• t: The number of authentication cells di : i = 1, 2...t
• p: A prime number
• (xc, yc)): The center location of cell (c)
• (xa, ya)): The location of a node (a)
• ‖: The operation of concatenation
• H: A Hash function
• IDa: Identity of each particular node (a) which is known by the BS
• ts: A recent time slot
• KLcin: An initial cell key
• KBSa A unique key shared between each node (a) and the BS
• Kdic : An authentication key derived by the BS and shared between cell mates in cell
c and cell mates in the authentication cell di
• KLc: The cell key
• EncK{M}: Encryption of a message M using key K
• MACK{M}: The message authentication code of a message M calculated over the
key K
• ε: A threshold number of endorsement nodes required to generate a legitimate report
• T : A predefined cell reporter validity
• N : Total nodes in the network
• N ′: Number of cells in the network
• n: Number of nodes of each cell
• z: Number of cell reporters
• λ: Packet size
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• PC{ε|z}: The probability of compromising a cell in terms of data confidentiality
• Pauth{ε|z}: The probability of compromising a cell in terms of data authenticity
• ‖: The operation of concatenation
• H: A Hash function
• EncK{M}: Encryption of a message M using key K
• MACK{M}: The message authentication code of a message M calculated over the
key K
• The report forward route between a particular cell (c) and the BS contains all
cells traversed by a virtual line between them as shown in Fig. 3.1, denoted as
dark-grey cells. The highlighted sequence is listed based on the position according
to the BS.
• Report authentication cell: A particular cell di belongs to the forward report
path of cell (c). Its location relative to (c) or the last authentication cell is t + 1
cells as shown by the light-grey cells depicted in Fig. 3.1. However, there is no
authentication cell in the case of a short report authentication route less than t+ 1
cells.
3.5 Setup Phase
Prior to their deployment, each node (a) is preloaded with the following parameters
{K, (x0, y0), IDa,∆, t, p}
Where:
K: An initial master key used as a seed to derive other keys.
(x0, y0): The BS location.
IDa: Identity of each particular node (a) which is known by the BS.
∆: The side length of each cell.
t: The number of authentication cells di : i = 1, 2...t.
p: A prime number.
Depending on their clocks and the application requirements, the setup phase time is
divided into multiple identical time slots ts to ensure the freshness of security credential
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of system construction shows report forward route and
authentication cells for a WSN with n ' 3 and t = 2.
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derivations. Using its location and the BS location as a reference point, the node excludes
its cell centre location using Theorem 3.1:
Theorem 3.1 Assume a square grid comprising squared cells where the side length of
each cell is ∆. Let cell C be one of these cells where point P (xp, yp) lies inside this
cell margin and another point B(xb, yb) lies on the border of grid, then the Cartesian
coordinates of the cell centre (xc, yc) are:
xc =
⌈
xp − xb
⌉
∆
+ 0.5 (3.1)
yc =
⌈
yp − yb
⌉
∆
+ 0.5 (3.2)
Based on Theorem 3.1, considering that the BS is located on the border of the terrain, the
coordinates of a particular cell centre is extracted. Then the following related credentials
are derived as shown in Algorithm-3.1:
• An instantaneous cell key Kts:
• An initial cell key (KLcin)
Algorithm 3.1 Derivation of security credentials inside each node (a) during the setup
phase.
Require: K, (x0, y0), ts,∆, (xa, ya)
Kts ← K‖ts
xc ←
⌈
xa−x0
⌉
∆
+ 0.5, yc ←
⌈
ya−y0
⌉
∆
+ 0.5
KLcin ← H(Kts‖(xc, yc)
Ensure: Kts, (xc, yc), KLcin
Every node in a particular cell creates a list of its neighboring nodes, hereafter known
as cell-mates, and derives a unique key that is shared between each node (a) and the BS
(KBSa ) using this formulation as illustrated in Algorithm 3.2:
KBSa = H(K‖IDa‖(x0, y0)) (3.3)
The message {LIST}a, which consists of the cell centre, the list of all cell mates and
the initial cell key KLcin, is sent by each node (a) to the BS using a cell-by-cell method.
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Algorithm 3.2 Creation and broadcasting of cell-mate list of each node (a).
Require: IDa, ts, (xa, ya), (xc, yc), (x0, y0), KLcin
a→ All cell-mates inside: EncKLcin{IDa, ts, (xc, yc)}
{CellMateList}a ≡ φ
for all cell-mates do
ACK → a
if ACK is valid then
Update {CellMateList}a
end if
end for
KBSa ← H(K‖IDa‖(x0, y0))
{LIST}a ← {((xc, yc), {CellMateList}a, KLcin}
a→ BS: EncKBSa {LIST}a
Ensure: KBSa , {LIST}a, {CellMateList}a
When the BS recieves the data packet of this message, it extracts the node identification
IDa from its header then rederives K
BS
a using 3.3. Then the BS decrypts {LIST}a and
extracts its contents:
1. Cell c coordinates (xc, yc) are used to determine the unique identity of that cell IDc
as:
IDc = xc‖yc (3.4)
2. The BS determines, Numac , the estimated number of nodes inside the cell c according
to the node a, as:
Numac =| {LIST}a | +1 (3.5)
The last parameter is compared later with the other Numac which are received from:
• The same node via different routes.
• The other nodes inside the same cell.
According to this comparison, the node reporting bogus information about its cell
mates is considered as a suspicious node which might be malicious or have a technical
problem. As a result, for any cell hosts (τ), a threshold number of suspicious nodes is
considered as a suspicious cell. In our scheme, based on experimental results, this value
is considered as:
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τ = b0.5Numacc+ 1 (3.6)
At this point, if any node/cell is detected as malicious, a revocation scheme is im-
plemented by calling Algorithm (4)/(5) to revoke nodes and cells listed in SusbNodes,
SusbCells respectively as discussed in Section (3.7) to overcome the possible consequences
caused by the presence of such malicious entities in the WSN. On the other hand, the
BS authenticates the illegitimate nodes inside the particular cell c by implementing the
following steps which are illustrated in Algorithm. 3.3:
1. Derive {LIST}c as:
{LIST}c = {LIST}a ∪ IDa (3.7)
2. Derive the cell key KLc as:
KLc =
{
KLcin τ = 0 (3.8)
H(Kts‖(xc, yc‖{LIST}c) τ > 0 (3.9)
3. Derive the authentication key Kdic which is shared between all nodes inside the cell
c and the nodes located inside the authentication cell di which is dedicated by the
BS to authenticate all messages generated by cell c as explained in Chapter 2.This
key is derived as:
Kdic = H(KLc‖KLdi‖(xdi , ydi)‖(xc, yc)) (3.10)
where (xdi , ydi) represents the Cartesian coordinates of the cell di centre.
4. Disclose {LIST}c, KLc and Kdic in one message which is encrypted using KBSa and
broadcast to each node in that cell.
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Algorithm 3.3 The BS verification of {LIST}a packages sent by each node.
Require: {LIST}a : a = 1, 2..., N
COUNT = 0;SuspNodes ≡ φ
for a = 1, 2..., N do
BS extracts IDa from the header of {LIST}a
KBSa ← H(K‖IDa‖(x0, y0))
DecKBSa {LIST}a = {(xc, yc), {CellMateList}a, KLcin}
IDc = xc‖yc
Numac =| {CellMateList}a |
if {LIST}a ≡ {LIST}a−1 then
COUNT + +
else
SuspNodes← a
end if
end for
if COUNT ≥ b0.5Numacc+ 1 then
Call Algorithm(4)
else
if COUNT < b0.5Numacc+ 1 then
SuspCells← IDc
Call Algorithm(5)
end if
Else
KLc ≡ KLc init
{LIST}c = {LIST}a ∪ IDa
BS → a : EncKBSa {KLc, {LIST}c}
if BS ← a : ACK then
Kdic = H(KLc‖KLdi‖(xdi , ydi)‖(xc, yc))
BS → a ∈ c : {di} ∪ {Kdic }
end if
end if
Ensure: KBSa , SuspNodes, SuspCells,KLc, {LIST}c
, {di}, {Kdic }
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All correspondence from the BS to any node (a) is implemented directly via a single
hop scheme due to the wide coverage property of the BS. An en-route-filtering scheme
presented in [114] is implemented, using the authentication keys Kdic , by the authenti-
cation cells di belonging to each particular cell (c) to reduce the amount of fake reports
arriving at the BS. Hence, the computation cost is decreased dramatically in comparison
with the cost of LEDS and MKMP, as shown in Chapter (5).
3.6 Report Generation
One of the main functions of the WSN is to detect particular events in the served terrain
such as movement, temperature, humidity and chemical emissions. In the location depen-
dent WSN topology 3.1, all nodes located within the margin of a particular cell will be
responsible for generating a report which illustrates the detected event in that cell. This
is called the event report, denoted as R and generated using the signal strength strategy
presented in [115] to guarantee the accuracy of that event. The generation of R is either:
• Automatic for every pre defined particular period of time.
or
• As a response to a request received from the BS.
Figure. 3.2 shows the structure of the event report R which includes the cell ID, event
location and event type.
   
   
   
   
 
ID Location Type Data
Event Report
Figure 3.2: Event Report R structure.
Due to the packet encryption by KLC , R, it is difficult for outside attackers to obtain
R. However, the attackers could inject fabricated information or create a forged event, so
some type of endorsement has to be embedded inside the generated reports in order to
consider it as an authenticated report when it is received by the BS.
The novel scheme, LKMP-SBS, presented in this Chapter considers each event report
generated by a specific cell and sent to the BS have to include three kinds of endorsements.
Hence, the BS accept the received report as a legitimate report if it is:
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1. The same as those received from each node in the event cell.
2. Contains the MAC generated by all authentication nodes.
3. Contains the signature of all z cell reporters of that cell.
3.6.1 The first endorsement: similar report is received from dif-
ferent nodes
The first endorsement is achieved by using the fundamentals of an (ε, n) threshold linear
secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [32] where the BS can regenerate the report by using the
received report shares generated by a threshold number ε of nodes. In contrast to similar
schemes, our scheme makes use of the uniqueness of the KBSa key which is shared between
each node in a particular cell and the BS as described in Algorithm. 4.7. Accordingly,
this key is used by each node in c to derive its unique share Ca from the encrypted event
report C = EKLC{R}:
Ca = C
∑
0≤i≤ε−1
(KBSa )
i mod p (3.11)
Obviously, Ca is generated uniquely by node a depending on its unique key K
BS
a which
is shared with the BS only. Moreover, each node inside cell (c) broadcasts its share, as a
tuple {Ca, IDa} to all its cell-mates. As a result, each node has an ability to collect and
concatenate a total of n− 1 shares received from its cell mates to create Cnew:
Cnew = C1‖C2...‖Cn (3.12)
3.6.2 The second endorsement: MAC of authentication nodes
The second endorsement of the report consists of multiple MACs calculated over Cnew.
These MACs are derived using the authentication keys dedicated and broadcast to each
node by the BS (Algorithm 3.3). For example, in the case of dedicating two authenti-
cation cells d1 and d2 as intermediate cells between the cell (c) and the BS, each node
inside (c) broadcasts the following to its cell-mates.
MACKLc{C,MACKd1c (Cnew),MACKd2c (Cnew)}
When a node (a) receives different i(n − 1) MACs, where i refers to the number of
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authentication cells, it sends a synthesized report containing the ID of all cell-mates and
the hosting cell, Cnew and i MACs, shared with each authentication cell. A random timer
scheme [78] is used to avoid report duplication. Based on the enclosed MACs, the en-route
filtering scheme is implemented by each authentication cell.
3.6.3 The third endorsement: signature of cell reporters
The third and the most important endorsement presented in this scheme is the signature
of the set of z cell reporters randomly selected out of a total of n cell nodes by the BS.
This set is changed every 1
T
seconds, where T is a predefined cell reporter validity period
which may be changeable based on multiple parameters like data importance, estimated
frequency of attacks and rhythm of event occurrences. The participation of the cell
reporter signatures in report generation overcomes the major security limitations in recent
schemes. In other schemes, the capture of a threshold number of nodes in a particular
cell enables the adversary to generate fake reports that might deceive all verification
processes of the intermediate cell and the BS. Therefore, the received packet from the
BS in LKMP-SBS is accepted if and only if all cell reporters are involved in the report
generation.
3.7 Key Revocation
As a part of its role, the BS is responsible for checking the reason of listing a node/cell
in the of SusbNodes and SusbCells, created previously in Agorithm. 3.3 depending on
the analysis of the information received from the surrounding nodes. If the node/cell is
found to be compromised, then a revocation scheme is implemented by the BS in order
to change all critical credentials shared with the suspicious entities and to overcome the
possible vulnerabilities caused by them such as:
1. Colluding with other malicious cells/nodes.
2. Starting any correspondences with secure cells/nodes
LKMP-SBS include two schemes to implement the required revocation in the case of
a suspicious node/cell being detected as illustrated in following subsections:
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3.7.1 Key revocation in case of detecting a suspicious node
This scheme is implemented in order to neutralise the possible impact of each node in
SusbNodes list. This is achieved by updating all nodes (except suspicious nodes) with
new credentials as shown in following steps:
1. a new list of nodes {LIST}new is created rather than the list of nodes inside a
particular cell c ({LIST}c). This list exclude any malicious node.
2. Based on (3.9), a new cell key KLc new is derived as:
KLc new = H((xc, yc‖ts‖{LIST}new) (3.13)
3. Based on (3.10), a new authentication key Kdic new is derived using the KLc new:
Kdic new = H(KLc new‖KLdi‖(xdi , ydi)‖(xc, yc)) (3.14)
4. Both new credentials KLc new and K
di
c new are broadcasted to each non-malicious
nodes (aˇ) in that cell as a {KLc new, IDc, Kdic : i = 1, 2...t} encrypted by KBSaˇ which
is derived in (3.3).
This procedure is illustrated in Algorithm. 3.4
For all nodes ∈ SusbNodes list, the BS calls Algorithm (3.4) to revoke their credentials
as shown below.
Algorithm 3.4 Revocation of suspicious node (s) located inside a cell (c) implemented
by the BS.
Require: IDs ∈ SusbNodes, IDc, KLc, Kdic : i = 1, 2...t
{LIST}new = ∀IDa(IDa ∈ {LIST}c
∧
IDa 6= IDs)
KLc new ← H((xc, yc‖ts‖{LIST}new)
Kdic new = H(KLc new‖KLdi‖(xdi , ydi)‖(xc, yc))
for ∀a(a ∈ {LIST}new do
BS → a : {KLc new, IDc, Kdic : i = 1, 2...t}
end for
RemoveKBSc
Ensure: {LIST}new, KLc new, Kdic : i = 1, 2...t}
3.7.2 Key revocation in case of detecting a suspicious node
Obviously, the potential consequences caused by a suspicious cell in a WSN is critically
high in comparison with the impact of a suspicious node. As a result, the following
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credentials have to be removed in order to neutralise any suspicious cell sc, as well as all
its nodes, immediately:
1. Remove the cell key KBSsc from the BS data base to prevent any further communi-
cation.
2. Update all other cells that have sc as their authentication cell by a new list of
authentication keys based on (3.10).
3. Remove all node-BS keys KBSa of any node belongs to the cell sc.
4. Update all security credentials of the adjacent cells by following all steps illustrated
in Algorithm. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
The set of adjacent cells shown in the above point is defined as all cells that have a
mutual border or point with the sc and denoted as {AdjacentCells}sc as shown in Fig.
3.3. Based on the centre coordinates, for a suspicious cell sc which its centre located at
(xsc, ysc), the list of adjacent cells is defined as :
{AdjacentCells}sc ={(xsc − 1, ysc + 1), (xsc, ysc + 1), (xsc + 1, ysc + 1),
(xsc − 1, ysc), (xsc + 1, ysc), (xsc − 1, ysc − 1),
(xsc, ysc − 1), (xsc + 1, ysc − 1)} (3.15)
(xsc,ysc)
Figure 3.3: Adjacent cells of a suspicious cell (sc).
Algorithm. 3.5 illustrates the above described procedure.
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Algorithm 3.5 Revocation of suspicious cell (sc) implemented by the BS.
Require: IDsc, KLsc, {AdjacentCells}sc, Kdisc : i = 1, 2...t
Remove KBSsc
for ∀di : i = 1, 2...t do
Remove Kdisc}
end for
for ∀a(a ∈ {LIST}c do
Remove KBSa }
end for
for ∀adjacentcellsofIDc do
Algorithm. 3.1
Algorithm. 3.2
Algorithm. 3.3
end for
3.8 Security Analysis of LKMP-SBS
The main role of the key management scheme present in this Chapter is to increase the
rigidity of a WSN security. Therefore, the main outcome of this Chapter is to analyse
the security of LKMP-SBS and compare it with some similar approaches. This system
security analysis is presented based on three aspects:
1. System’s capability of thwarting typical routing attacks.
2. The role of the number of cell reporters (z) in the security of each particular cell.
3. The system rigidity in terms of wireless security requirements for data confidentiality
and authenticity.
The last two points will be investigated using the likelihood of compromising the
entire WSN as a result of launching a Random Node Capture Attack (RNCA), which is
described in Chapter 2. This likelihood is measured by the percentage of compromised
cells and presented by a graph depicting the relationship between the total number of
compromised nodes versus the percentage of compromised cells as will shown in the rest
of this Chapter.
3.8.1 System Robustness Against Routing Attacks
As presented earlier, LKMP-SBS uses the node positions to derive the security credentials
required to protect both cell-by-cell communication and the required correspondence be-
tween cell-mates. Hence, our scheme is secure enough to thwart almost all typical attacks.
For instance, our scheme is strong enough to thwart the following routing attacks:
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• Black hole and selective forwarding attacks: as a location dependent scheme, the
routing decision in LKMP-SBS is made by the data source based on the location
of both source and destination, which are represented by node(s) and the BS. Ac-
cordingly, this scheme has enough resistance to thwart black hole and selective
forwarding attacks.
• Sybil attack: Any message disseminated between two entities in a WSN employing
LKMP-SBS is encrypted by a key derived depending on the location of the data
source. Such authentication prevents any node from pretending to be a different
node in the network. Thus, Sybil attack has no ability to be launched in this scheme.
• Wormhole attack: Because of LKMP-SBS dependency on nodes location-dependent
credentials in each packet authentication, it is an effective scheme in addressing this
type of attacks.
• Node replication attack: LKMP-SBS can detect the node replication attack and
thwart it because of the location awareness of each group of nodes within a cell.
Any replicated node can be easily detected by cell mates and reported to the BS to
be revoked using the key revocation scheme explained in 3.7.2.
• Hello flood attack: Because of the precise setup-phase pf the LKMP-SBS explained
in Section 3.5, accepting or dealing with any HELLO massage is bounded by both
the cell and node keys which are location dependent. Therefore, this scheme has an
effective ability to detect and thwart this type of attacks.
3.8.2 The impact of z value on the security of each particular
cell
As explained earlier in Section 3.6, the validity of any received report depends on three
aspects:
1. Same report is recieved from a threshold number of nodes, denoted as ε.
2. MAC(s) generated by authentication nodes.
3. The participation of all z cell reporters in generating the event report.
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The number of cell reporters z is selected depending on the application protocol,
security level required and available resources. Because of this system being location de-
pendant, z may change due to security attacks, node failures and geographical alterations.
Therefore, the effect of the value of z is worth investigating in order to realize the opti-
mum design of our scheme. This Section investigates the effect of z on the likelihood of
compromising a particular cell. The probability of an adversary compromising all z cell
reporters inside a cell that contains n nodes can be calculated using the compromising
strategy illustrated in the following example:
Example 3.1
Assume a WSN consisting of N ′ cells where each cell contains 10 nodes (n = 10), 3 of
them are selected by the BS to be cell reporters (z = 3). The adversary has a:
1. probability of P (E1) =
3
10
to compromise all z cell reporters in the 1st trial.
2. probability of P (E2) =
2
9
to compromise the remaining 2 cell reporters from the
remaining 9 nodes in the 2nd trial.
3. probability of P (E3) =
1
8
to compromise the last cell reporter from the remaining
8 nodes in the 3rd trial.
The probability of compromising all 3 cell reporters in a row is:
P = P (E1)P (E2)P (E3) =
1
120
This can be generalised as follows:
Pzcomp =(
z
n
)(
z − 1
n− 1)(
z − 2
n− 2)...(
1
n− z + 1)
Pzcomp =
z(z − 1)(z − 2)...(1)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)...(n− z + 1) (3.16)
The numerator is clearly a factorial of z while the denominator can be simplified to:
n(n− 1)(n− 2)...(n− z + 1) =
x∏
i=1
(N − z + i)
=
n!
(n− z)! (3.17)
By substituting ((3.17)) in ((3.16)):
Pzcomp =
(z!)(n− z)!
n!
(3.18)
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The above mentioned equation describes the relationship between the probability of com-
promising a particular cell and the number of its cell reporters (z). This equation has a
vital importance as it is the cornerstone that is used to determine the optimum value of
z as shown in Section 3.9.
3.8.3 Security Strength Regarding Data Confidentiality
The content of the generated report by an event cell is only revealed to its nodes because it
is encrypted by the cell key KLc owned by them. This guarantees the data confidentiality
even when a number of intermediate nodes are compromised. However, if one of the nodes
involved in report generation is compromised, the report contents could be revealed. In
order to understand the security strength in this case, the effect of a random node capture
attack (RNCA) on the entire system is investigated by determining the probability of
compromising all cells due to RNCA. The cell is considered compromised if and only if:
1. The threshold number ε of nodes are compromised.
2. All the z cell reporters are compromised.
Regarding the first point, assume that x nodes are compromised out of a total of
N nodes in the network. As explained in 3.6.1, the number of nodes inside each cell is
considered to be n while only ε of them can generate a report. Let x nodes be compromised
so the adversary has
(
N
x
)
methods to compromise x nodes. Additionally, each cell has
(
n
ε
)
different methods to create a legitimate report. The total number of different methods to
implement both processes is
(
N
x
)(
n
ε
)
. Regarding the whole network, suppose j nodes out
of ε endorsement nodes are compromised. Then the adversary picks ε nodes randomly
out of n sensor nodes, captures j nodes out of the ε nodes participating in the report
generation and then compromises (x − j) out of (N − ε) nodes as a final step. The
resultant probability Pj of capturing j nodes out of ε endorsement nodes is
Pe{j} =
(
N
ε
)(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
)(
N
ε
)
=
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.19)
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As a result, the probability of compromising none of the ε nodes is determined by
substituting (j = 0) into (3.19)
Pe{0} =
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) (3.20)
On the other hand, the probability Pz{j} of capturing j cell reporters out of the z cell
reporter set needs to be calculated. To achieve this, a set of z cell reporters is assumed
to be static (as a worst case scenario), so that the same computations shown in (3.20)
are followed. Bayes’ theorem [116] is used to calculate the probability of capturing a
particular cell in terms of data confidentiality:
PC{ε|z} =
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) )(1− (N−zx )(
N
x
) ) (3.21)
For different values of N , n and z, the percentage of captured cells concerning data
confidentiality in terms of the number of compromised nodes is shown in Fig. 3.4, 3.5,
3.6 and 3.7.
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(a) ε = 4
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(b) ε = 5
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(c) ε = 6
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(d) ε = 7
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(e) ε = 8
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Figure 3.4: Data confidentiality of LKMP-SBS and MKMP under random capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 5, 000 for different values of ε and z.
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(a) ε = 4
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(b) ε = 5
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(c) ε = 6
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(d) ε = 7
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(e) ε = 8
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Figure 3.5: Data confidentiality of LKMP-SBS and MKMP under random capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 10, 000 for different values of ε and z.
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(a) ε = 4
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(b) ε = 5
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(c) ε = 6
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(d) ε = 7
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(e) ε = 8
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Figure 3.6: Data confidentiality of LKMP-SBS and MKMP under random capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 20, 000 for different values of ε and z.
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(b) ε = 5
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(c) ε = 6
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(d) ε = 7
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(e) ε = 8
3000 6000 9000 12000 15000
Number of compromised nodes
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f c
om
pr
om
isi
ng
 a
ll 
ce
lls
 
in
 te
rm
s o
f d
at
a 
co
nf
id
en
tia
lit
y 
P C
 {e
|z}
 
MKMP
LKMP-SBS ( z=1)
LKMP-SBS ( z=2)
LKMP-SBS ( z=3)
LKMP-SBS ( z=4)
(f) ε = 9
Figure 3.7: Data confidentiality of LKMP-SBS and MKMP under random capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 30, 000 for different values of ε and z.
Those figures showing obviously that:
1. The security of LKMP-SBS in terms of data confidentiality, PC{ε|z}, is observed to
be reversely proportional to the values of z.
2. LKMP-SBS outperforms MKMP for any value of (N ,ε and z).
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3. MKMP and LKMP-SBS is proved to outperform LEDS in terms of data confiden-
tiality because of the findings of [21] which reflects that MKMP is significantly
superior to LEDS in terms of data confidentiality.
The behaviour of the relationship between x and PC{ε|z} is the same for any value of N
and ε where PC{ε|z} cureve is increasing by x increment. However, the curve slope varies
depending on N and ε values. These differences are depicted in Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9
respectively. The two figures showing that:
PC{e|z} = f(
1
N
, ε) (3.22)
Following two sections discuss and explains the mathematical proof of both (3.22).
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Number of compromised nodes
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f c
om
pr
om
isi
ng
 a
ll 
ce
lls
 in
 te
rm
s o
f 
da
ta
 c
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y 
P C
 {e
|z}
 
 
 
N=10,000
N=20,000
N=30,000
N=40,000
N=50,000
Figure 3.8: The effect of changing the number of whole nodes in the network N on the
Probability of compromising all cells in terms of data confidentiality due to RNCA,
ε = 10, z = 5.
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Figure 3.9: The effect of changing the number of endorsement nodes in the network ε on
the Probability of compromising all cells in terms of data confidentiality due to RNCA,
N = 10, 000, z = ε
2
.
3.8.3.1 The effect of N on the value of PC{ε|z}
The used metric in the measurement of data confidentiality robustness, as mentioned in
(3.8), is the ratio of compromised cells caused by implementing the RNCA. However,
increasing the entire number of nodes, N , in the WSN increases the number of total cells
assuming the number of nodes per cell is constant. Therefore, increasing the value of N
definitely decrease the ratio of compromised cells and leading to an enhancement in the
security of the system in terms of data confidentiality.
The mathematical proof of (3.22) is achieved, based on (3.21), as:
Proof 3.1
PC{ε|z} =
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) )(1− (N−zx )(
N
x
) )
= P1P2
⇒ PC{ε|z} = f(P1, P2) (3.23)
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P1 = f(
(
N
x
)(
N−ε
x
))
∝
N !
x!(N−x)!
(N−ε)!
x!(N−ε−x)!
N !
x!(N − x)! ·
x!(N − ε− x)!
(N − ε)! =
(N − ε)!∏εi=1(N − ε+ i)(N − ε− x)!
(N − ε)!(N − x− ε)!∏x+ei=1 (N − ε− x+ i)
=
∏ε
i=1(N − ε+ i)∏x+e
i=1 (N − ε− x+ i)
=
1∏x
i=1(N − x− ε+ i)
for N, x and n ∈ N
=
1
Nx − a1Nx−1 + a2Nx−2 − · · · axN (3.24)
From both (3.23) and (3.24):
P1 = f(
1
N
)
P2 = f(
1
N
)
⇒ PC{ε|z} = f( 1
N
) (3.25)

3.8.3.2 The effect of ε on the value of PC{ε|z}
There are two reasons that explain the relationship between ε and PC{ε|z}:
1. Increasing the number of endorsement nodes while keeping a constant value of z
increase the likelihood of generating a fake report from that cell.
2. Increasing ε will increase the value of n which leads to a decrease in the number of
cells in the WSN assuming the total number of nodes N in the WSN is constant.
Hence, the ratio of compromised cells is increased which reduces the security level
of the system in terms of data confidentiality.
The mathematical proof of (3.22) is achieved, based on (3.21), as:
Proof 3.2
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PC{ε|z} =
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) )(1− (N−zx )(
N
x
) ) (3.26)
While the second part of above equation is not a function of ε, it is considered as a
constant k:
PC{ε|z} = kP1
⇒ PC{ε|z} = f(P1) (3.27)
P1 = f(
1(
N−ε
x
))
= f(
x!(N − ε− x)!
(N − ε)! ) (3.28)
While x≫ e, (3.28) can be written as:
P1 = f(
x!(N − x)!
(N − ε)! )
= f(
1
(N − ε)!)
⇒ P1 = f(ε) (3.29)
Based on both (3.27) and (3.29):
PC{ε|z} = f(ε) (3.30)

3.8.4 Security Strength for Data Authenticity
Data authenticity in a particular cell is compromised if the attacker creates a forged
report as a result of capturing at least ε sensor nodes including all z cell reporters. To
show the security strength of our scheme, a formula to calculate the probability of all
compromised cells in terms of data authenticity is derived using Bayes’ theorem [116] in
order to calculate the probability of an event resulted by two events:
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• Compromising ε nodes:
Pauth{ε} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.31)
• Sending a bogus report signed by the whole z nodes:
Pauth{z} =
z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.32)
Hence, the fraction of compromised cell caused by compromising x nodes in terms of
data authenticity can be written as:
Pauth{ε|z} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.33)
For different values of N , n and z, the percentage of captured cells concerning data
authenticity in terms of the number of compromised nodes is shown in Fig. 3.10, 3.11,
3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, 3.20 and 3.21. Those figures show that:
1. The fraction of captured cells, measured as Pauth{ε|z} , increases with the number of
captured nodes.
2. Pauth{ε|z} is found to be reversely proportional to the value of z.
3. LKMP-SBS clearly outperforms MKMP in terms of data authenticity for all values
of x, N , n and z.
4. LKMP-SBS shows an improvement in comparison to LEDS only for higher number
of compromised nodes. For each set of variables, LKMP-SBS shown to be outper-
forming LEDS just when x is more than a threshold value xt as reflected in Table.
3.1.
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Figure 3.10: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 10, 000, ε = 4 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.11: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 10, 000, ε = 6 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.12: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 10, 000, ε = 8 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.13: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 10, 000, ε = 10 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.14: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 20, 000, ε = 4 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.15: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 20, 000, ε = 6 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.16: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 20, 000, ε = 8 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.17: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 20, 000, ε = 10 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.18: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 30, 000, ε = 4 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.19: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 30, 000, ε = 6 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.20: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 30, 000, ε = 8 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 3.21: Data authenticity of LKMP-SBS, LEDS and MKMP vesus a number of
compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters N = 30, 000, ε = 10 and
z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Table 3.1: Approximate value of xt for different values of N , ε and z.
N ε
Xt
z = 1 z = 2 z = 3
10, 000
4 1850 3375 4875
6 2250 3900 5700
8 2375 4090 5825
10 2500 4100 5875
20, 000
4 4000 6750 9750
6 4600 7900 11050
8 5000 8200 11350
10 5100 8750 11500
30, 000
4 6000 10500 15500
6 7000 12000 17300
8 7500 12900 17400
10 8000 13000 17500
It is obvious that the behaviour of the relationship between x and Pauth{ε|z} is the same
for any value of N and ε where Pauth{ε|z} curves are increasing by x increment. However,
the curve slope varies depending on N and ε values. These differences are depicted in
Fig. 3.22 and Fig. 3.23 respectively. The two figures showing that:
Pauth{ε|z} = f(
1
N
, ε) (3.34)
The following two sections discuss and explain the mathematical proof of (3.34).
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Figure 3.22: The effect of changing the number of whole nodes in the network N on the
Probability of compromising all cells in terms of data authenticity due to RNCA,
ε = 10, z = 5.
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Figure 3.23: The effect of changing the number of endorsement nodes in the network ε
on the Probability of compromising all cells in terms of data authenticity due to RNCA,
N = 10, 000, z = ε
2
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3.8.4.1 The effect of N on the value of Pauth{ε|z}
The used metric in the measurement of data authenticity robustness, as mentioned in
(3.8), is the ratio of compromised cells caused by implementing the RNCA. However,
increasing the entire number of nodes, N , in WSN increases the number of total cells
assuming the number of nodes per cell is constant. Therefore, increasing the value of
N definitely decrease the ratio of compromised cells and leads to an enhancement in the
security of the system in terms of data authenticity.
The mathematical proof of (3.34) is achieved, based on (3.33), as:
Proof 3.3
Pauth{ε|z} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.35)
= P1P2
⇒ Pauth{ε|z} = f(P1, P2) (3.36)
While
(
ε
j
)
in (3.36) is a non N dependent term, it is considered as a constant:
P1 ∝
ε∑
j=1
(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
)
∝
ε∑
j=1
(N−ε)!
(x−j)!(N−ε−x+j)!
(N)!
x!(N−x)!
∝
ε∑
j=1
x!(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(x− j)!(N − ε− x+ j)!
∝
ε∑
j=1
(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(N − ε− x+ j)! (3.37)
ε∑
j=1
(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(N − ε− x+ j)! =
ε∑
j=1
∏ε−j
k=1(N − x− ε+ j + k)∏ε
k=1(N − ε+ k)
=
N ε−j − a1N ε−j−1 + a2N ε−j−2 − · · · aε−jN
N εx− a1N ε−j−1 + a2N ε−j−2 − · · · aεN
While (ε− j) < ε
ε∑
j=1
(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(N − ε− x+ j)! = f(
1
N
) (3.38)
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P1 = f = f(
1
N
)
P2 = f(
1
N
)
⇒ Pauth{ε|z} = f( 1
N
) (3.39)

3.8.4.2 The effect of ε on the value of Pauth{ε|z}
There are two reasons explaining the relationship between ε and PC{ε|z}:
1. Increasing the number of endorsement nodes while keeping a constant value of z
increase the likelihood of generating a fake report from that cell.
2. Increasing ε will increase the value of n which leads to decrease the number of cells
in the WSN assuming the total number of nodes N in the WSN is constant. Hence,
the ratio of compromised cells is increased which reduces the security level of the
system in terms of data confidentiality.
The mathematical proof of (3.34) is achieved, based on (3.33), as:
Proof 3.4
Pauth{ε|z} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.40)
While the second part of above equation is not a function of ε, it is considered as a
constant k:
Pauth{ε|z} = kP1
⇒ Pauth{ε|z} = f(P1) (3.41)
P1 ∝
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
)
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While: j≪ x and ε≪ N , (3.41) can be rewritten as:
P1 ∝
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)
∝
ε∑
j=1
∏j
k=1(ε− j + k)
j!
∝ 1
j!
· [εj − a1εj−1 + a2N j−2 − · · · ajε]
⇒ P1 = f(ε) (3.42)
Based on both (3.41) and (3.42):
Pauth{ε|z} = f(ε) (3.43)

3.9 Optimum number of Cell Reporters
Previous sections showed the number of cell reporters z as a cornerstone of LKMP-SBS.
On the one hand, it is obvious from the theory that increasing the value of z will definitely
decrease the likelihood of generating a fake report inside any cell in the network. On the
other hand, the results shown in the last sections indicated by three security parameters
PC{ε|z}, Pauth{ε|z} and Pzcomp have a different proportionality to z as stated in (3.18), (3.21)
and (3.33). Therefore, in order to guarantee the optimality of the proposed system, the
following two sections investigate the optimum value of cell reporters. In the first Section,
a mathematical analysis for the relationship between PC{ε|z} and z is achieved to find its
margins. Furthermore, the optimality of z is investigated by considering its effect on the
security of the cell itself using the parameter Pzcomp.
3.9.1 Mathematical Analysis of optimum z based on PC{ε|z} and
Pauth{ε|z}
In this Section, the optimum number of cell reporters z will be investigated based on
the expressions PC{ε|z} and Pauth{ε|z} given in ((3.21)) and ((3.33)) respectively. The
72
3.9 Optimum number of Cell Reporters
mathematical investigation aims to calculate the optimum number of cell reporters zmin
which leads to minimizing both (Pc) and (Pauth). It is obvious that ((3.21)) and ((3.33))
consists of two parts:
• For the PC{ε|z}, it consist of two terms:
1.
(
1− (
N−ε
x )
(Nx)
)
which is a constant term in term of z
2.
(
1− (
N−z
x )
(Nx)
)
which is a function of z.
• For the Pauth{ε|z}, it is also consist of two terms:
1.
∑ε
j=1
(εj)(
N−ε
x−j )
(Nx)
which is a constant term in term of z
2.
∑z
j=1
(zj)(
N−z
x−j )
(Nx)
which is a function of z.
Hence, the set of optimum values of zopt can be expressed as:
zopt = arg min
z
(
z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)(
N
x
) ) ∩ arg min
z
(
1−
(
N−z
x
)(
N
x
) ) (3.44)
It is obvious that in the first part zmin = 1 according to the summation limits of the first
part. However, the second part of the equation above shows that zmax ≤ N − x. As a
result:
1 ≤ zopt ≤ (N − x) (3.45)
By substituting (3.45) in both ((3.21)) and ((3.33)):
Pc|zmin =
x
N
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) ) (3.46)
Pc|zmax =
N !− x!(N − x)!
N !
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) ) (3.47)
Pauth|zmin =
x
N
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.48)
Pauth|zmax =
N−x∑
j=1
(
N−x
j
)(
x
x−j
)(
N
x
) ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) (3.49)
Next the optimality of z in terms of cell capturing and its effect on the integrity of
generated reports is investigated.
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3.9.2 Mathematical Analysis of optimum z based on Pzcomp
As explained early in Section 3.24, the relationship between a probability of compromising
a particular cell with the number of its cell reporters is stated by (3.18) as:
Pzcomp =
(z!)(n− z)!
n!
This relationship is depicted as shown in Fig. 3.24 which shows that Pzcomp approaches
zero when z lies in a specific range of values indicated as ∆z. In addition, n and ∆z are
related as:
n = f(∆z) (3.50)
This indicates that increasing the number of nodes inside a cell increases the flexibility
in terms of selecting the optimum number of cell reporters. For instance, when the number
of nodes inside a cell is 10, the operator has to select z ∈ [3, 7] to ensure a very low
probability of compromised cells. On the other hand, the operator can choose z ∈ [2, 28]
when n = 30 and be sure of the same compromised cell probability (P ≤ 0.01). To be
more precise about the optimal value of z, we investigate the minimum point for each
graph in Fig. 3.24 to find the optimum value of zopt. However, f(x) = x! is a discrete
function which require a continuous mathematical approximation to be differentiable.
According to [117], Gamma approximation is one of the promising methods:
x! = Γ(x− 1) (3.51)
Where:
Γ(z) =
∫ ∞
0
xz−1e−x dx (3.52)
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Accordingly, zopt is calculated as:
zopt = arg min
z
{
(z!)(n− z)!
n!
}
∂
∂z
(z!)(n− z)! = 0
(n− z)!Γ(z + 1)ψ0(z + 1)
= z!Γ(n− z + 1)ψ0(n− z + 1)
ψ0(z + 1) = ψ0(n− z + 1)
While ψm(x) is a monotonic function [118]:
z =
n
2
(3.53)
It is clear that ((3.53)) represents a critical point for Pzcomp, so the first derivative test
is applied in order to check weather it is a local minima or not. Two points are selected
as (0 ∈ (−∞, n
2
)) and (n ∈ (n
2
,∞)) in order to implement this test. Therefore, the first
derivative of Pzcomp is calculated as:
∂
∂z
(Pzcomp) =
∂
∂z
z!(n− z)!
n!
=
1
n!
[(n− z)!Γ(z + 1)ψ0(z + 1)−
z!Γ(n− z + 1)ψ0(n− z + 1)] (3.54)
As a result, at z = 0
∂
∂z
(z!)(n− z)!/n!|z=0 = n!Γ(1)ψ
0(1)
n!
− Γ(n+ 1)ψ
0(n+ 1)]
n!
= ψ0(1)− ψ0(n+ 1) (3.55)
On the other hand, when z = n:
∂
∂z
(z!)(n− z)!/n!|z=n =Γ(n+ 1)ψ
0(n+ 1)
n!
− n!Γ(1)ψ
0(1)]
n!
=ψ0(n+ 1)− Γ(1)ψ0(1) (3.56)
Based on Theorem. 3.2, (3.55) is a negative term for all values of n while (3.56) is a
positive term for all n values. As a result, z = n
2
is proved to be the optimum value of cell
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reporters that give the lowest probability of compromising a particular cell Pzcomp. As an
example, three different values of n are chosen as 10, 20 and 30. The resultant optimum
value of z are obviously 5, 10 and 15 respectively. This is shown in Fig. 3.24.
Theorem 3.2 For all m,n ∈ R+:
ψm(n+ 1) ≥ ψm(1)
Proof 3.5
For all n, x ∈ R+:
xn ≥ 1
xne−x ≥ e−x
According to domination rule for definite integration [119]
∫ ∞
0
xne−xdx ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−xdx∫ ∞
0
x(n+1)−1e−xdx ≥
∫ ∞
0
x0e−xdx∫ ∞
0
x(n+1)−1e−xdx ≥
∫ ∞
0
x1−1e−xdx
Γ(n+ 1) ≥ Γ(1)
ln Γ(n+ 1) ≥ ln Γ(1)
∂m
∂zm
ln Γ(n+ 1) ≥ ∂
m
∂zm
ln Γ(1)
ψm(n+ 1) ≥ ψm(1) (3.57)

3.10 Conclusion
In this Chapter, a novel Location Dependent Key Management Protocol for a Single BS
WSNs (LKMP-SBS) is presented and it is proved to achieve an improved performance
compared to existing schemes. Each node has its unique credentials derived based on its
position, which removes the influence of the capturing of a node on other sensor nodes
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Figure 3.24: The relationship between number of cell reporters (z) and the probability
of compromising all cell reporters inside a cell of 10, 20 and 30 nodes.
in its vicinity. Each cell has a particular number of cell reporters z which are randomly
chosen by the BS. The involvement of cell reporters in report generation is compulsory,
otherwise, the received report at the BS side will be discarded. An extensive analysis was
presented to evaluate this scheme, which shows a distinct robustness against a significant
number of captured nodes. In contrast to other schemes, our system shows a considerable
improvement in terms of data confidentiality and data authenticity. Regarding the data
confidentiality, for three values of z (1,2,3) the improvement is 95%, 90% and 85% re-
spectively when 1000 nodes are compromised. This is due to the ability of the adversary
to disclose event contents in the case of compromising one of the ε endorsement nodes
in MKMP and LEDS, whereas in our new scheme the data is disclosed if and only if the
entire set of z cell reporters and all ε endorsement nodes are captured. On the other
hand, the improvement drops to 75%, 57% and 43% when the number of compromised
nodes increased to 5000 due to the increment in the probability of compromising the
entire set of cell reporters when more nodes are compromised. Furthermore, in terms of
data authenticity an enhancement of 49%, 24%, 12.5% is gained using our approach with
z = 1, 2, 3 respectively when half of all nodes are compromised. However, LKMP-SBS
shows an improvement in comparison to LEDS only for higher values of x. Hence, It
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outperform LEDS when (x ≥ 4000, x ≥ 7000, x ≥ 10000) and z = 1, 2, 3 respectively. As
a result, LKMP-SBS is superior compared to the other schemes in terms of the fraction
of compromised cells caused by RNCA thwarting data authenticity, especially when 50%
of the nodes are captured. Finally, the optimum number of cell reporters was extensively
investigated related to the security requirements, which was proven to be z =
n
2
.
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Chapter 4
Location-Dependent Key
Management Protocol for a Multiple
BSs WSN
4.1 Introduction
The usage of multiple BS with WSN is one of hot topics targeted recently by research
community. The employed BSs are used to collect data, control sensor functionalities and
integrate WSN with the Internet. Recent researches are proposing multiple BS to address
high power consumption [120,121], routing difficulties [122] and security challenges [3,123,
124]. According to [3,124] the usage of a single BS is considered as a single point of failure
in IoT integrated WSN as presented in Chapter 2. Therefore, this Chapter presents state-
of-the art of multiple BS WSN structure and the possible control schemes. Accordingly,
a Location Dependent Key Management Protocol for a Multiple BS WSN (LKMP-MBS)
is proposed. This protocol is built on a similar foundation as the LKMP-SBS discussed
in the previous Chapter. Hence, this protocol depends on security credentials derived
mainly from the geographical location of each sensor node within the network. However,
most of procedures are different from those used in LKMP-SBS due to the significant
change in the WSN structure and relevant protocols. Moreover, this Chapter address
the expected challenges, such as the impact of the number of BSs on the overall security
and the mechanism of selecting cell reporters by each BS. In this Chapter, the following
aspects will be discussed:
1. The security robustness of the LKMP-MBS in terms of data confidentiality and
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authenticity.
2. The optimum number of cell reporters.
Both an extensive mathematical analysis and simulation results are presented to inves-
tigate the above points. Accordingly, LKMP-MBS had been compared with the LKMP-
SBS to show the possible challenges faced when multiple BSs are employed. In addi-
tion, LKMP-MBS is proved to outperform other existing multiple BSs location dependent
schemes in terms of data confidentiality data authenticity and computation cost. Mor-
ever, the efficiency of the LKMP-MBS as a lightweight scheme in terms of communication
cost is presented in Chapter 5.
4.2 WSN Control Scheme by Multiple BSs
It is obvious that the BS has vital responsibilities such as objective requesting, strategy
planning, collecting reports from the WSN nodes, adding/removing nodes and accordingly,
controlling the related procedures. in the proposed scheme, the topology of a multiple BS
WSN is classified, according to the manner of BS control, into:
• Individual control (IndCon): The WSN terrain is divided into subregions where each
region is controlled by a particular BS as shown in Fig. 4.1. Every node is connected
to a BS assigned to the node’s region and responsible for handling the functionality
of each node there by arranging the nodes’ issuing, controlling, reporting and data
collection.
• Collaborative control (ColCon): The entire WSN is controlled collaboratively by
every BS as shown in Fig.4.2. Hence, each BS governs a particular function which
is implemented by a specific cell or set of cells. Accordingly, each node in this case
has a connection with each BS controlling that region, storing the required security
credentials and collecting the reports related to the particular function implemented
by that node. This scheme is the cornerstone of the emerging technology for multi-
functional WSNs or shared-WSNs [125,126]
Based on this classification, Section 4.9 will investigate the optimality number of cell
reporters. In addition, Chapter 5 will consider the same classification in the analysis of
node mobility.
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Figure 4.1: A WSN controlled individually by two BSs BS1 and BS2
4.3 System Consideration
The LKMP-MBS is considered to be used by a WSN employed over a wide border (mar-
itime or terrestrial ) terrain to be used in surveillance missions. Such a WSN is assumed
to have a predefined shape, size, number of sensors and number of BSs. The sensor nodes
are considered to have limited resources, whereas all BSs have no limitation in their re-
sources. There are two schemes to allocate load balance between different BSs The set
of BSs in this WSN is responsible for requesting surveillance reports from the sensors in
service, collecting the data generated by sensor nodes and controlling the en-route filter-
ing processes. Each BS is considered to have a communication facility with coverage over
most of the sensors as depicted in Fig. 1. The monitored region is divided virtually into
square cells have similar size. While all nodes are assumed to be distributed uniformly,
each cell is considered to contain the same number of nodes. Each node has an ability to
calculate its position using a secure localisation scheme [111–113]. Finally, every sensor
and BS is considered to have a unique public key (its name) and a private key (ID). As
mentioned in the previous section, a set of z sensor nodes inside each cell are selected
randomly by a BS or a set of BSs and selected as cell reporters, which are considered
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Figure 4.2: A WSN controlled collaboratively by two BSs BS1 and BS2
as jury members, where the signature of any one is considered as a firm condition of the
report to be accepted. Otherwise, the report is considered as a bogus report and denied
by all BSs receiving it. As explained in Chapter 2, in other schemes, the compromising
of a threshold number of sensor nodes in a specific cell gives the adversary an ability to
generate a bogus reports which might pass all verification process of the intermediate cell
and the BS. Therefore, the presence of the cell reporter signature condition prevents any
attacker from generating a fake report unless it succeeds in compromising all cell reporters
in the event cell. The cell reporters set is modified every 1
T
seconds, where the predefined
validity period T of the cell reporters might be varied according to several parameters
such as estimated attack frequency, data importance the the data occurrence rhythm.
4.4 Notation and Terms
In this Chapter, the following notations and terms have a significant importance:
82
4.4 Notation and Terms
• K: An initial master key used as a seed to derive other keys
• (x(i)0 , y(i)0 ): The location of the (i)th BS
• ∆: The side length of each cell
• t: The number of authentication cells dω : i = 1, 2...t
• p: A prime number
• M : The number of BSs in the network.
• xc: M × 1 vector contains the x coordination of the center of cell c regarding each
BS.
• yc: M × 1 vector contains the y coordination of the center of cell c regarding each
BS.
• (xa, ya): The location of a sensor node (n)
• ‖: The operation of concatenation
• H: A Hash function
• IDa: Identity of each particular sensor node (n) which is known by the BS
• ts: A recent time slot
• KLcin: M × 1 vector contains M initial cell key derived by the cell c regarding the
location of each BS
• KBS(i)a A unique key shared between each node (a) and the (i)th BS
• Kdωc : An authentication key derived by the BS and shared between cell mates in
cell c and cell mates in the authentication cell dω
• KLc: The cell key
• EncK{M}: Encryption of a message m using key K
• MACK{M}: The message authentication code of a message M calculated over the
key K
• ε: A threshold number of endorsement nodes required to generate a legitimate report
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• T : A predefined cell reporter validity
• N : Total nodes in the network
• N ′: Number of cells in the network
• n: Number of nodes of each cell
• z: Number of cell reporters
• λ: Packet size
• PC{ε|z}: The probability of compromising a cell in terms of data confidentiality
• Pauth{ε|z}: The probability of compromising a cell in terms of data authenticity
• The report forward route between a particular cell (c) and the BS contains all
cells traversed by a virtual line between them as shown in Fig. 4.3, denoted as
dark-grey cells. The highlighted sequence is listed based on the position according
to the BS.
• Report authentication cell: A particular cell dω belongs to the forward report
path of cell (c). Its location relative to (c) or the last authentication cell is t + 1
cells as shown by the light-grey cells depicted in Fig. 4.3. However, there is no
authentication cell in the case of a short report authentication route less than t+ 1
cells.
4.5 Setup Phase
Before the deployment process, each sensor node n is loaded by following parameters:
{K, IDa,∆, p, t,S}.
Where: S = [S1 S2] =

x
(1)
0 y
(1)
0
x
(2)
0 y
(2)
0
. .
. .
. .
x
(M)
0 y
(M)
0

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Report Authentication Cells
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:Sensor Node
Figure 4.3: Illustration of system construction showing report forward route and
authentication cells for a WSN with M = 3 ,n ' 3 and t = 2
85
4.5 Setup Phase
Moreover, in order to guarantee the freshness of derived credentials, the setup phase
duration is divided into adequate time slots τ depending on each node clock and the WSN
application. Using its location and the first BS location as a reference point, each node
excludes its cell centre location using Theorem 3.1. Thereafter, based on the location of
each node and the preloaded BSs locations, each node derives the matrix of the hosting
cell c centre coordinates xc and yc by using Algorithm. 3.1. Accordingly, the matrix of
initial cell keys KLcin is derived by all nodes in the cell c as shown in Algorithm. 4.6.
Algorithm 4.6 Security credentials derivation by each particular node during setup phase
Require: K,S, τ,∆, (xs, ys)
Kτ ← K‖τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
xa−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
ya−S2
∆
⌉
KLcin ←

H(Kτ‖xc(1)‖yc(1))
H(Kτ‖xc(2)‖yc(2))
.
.
H(Kτ‖xc(M)‖yc(M))

Ensure: Kτ , (xc, yc),KLcin
Then, each sensor node inside a cell c discovers and creates a list of its cell-mates,
which refers to all sensor nodes located inside the same cell. This list is sent each node
to the M BSs of the WSN as shown in Algorithm. 4.7.
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Algorithm 4.7 Cell-mate list created by each sensor node n and sent to each BS BS` :
` = 1, 2...M
Require: IDa, τ, (xa, ya),xc,yc,S,KLcin
for each BS BS` do
KLcin` = KLcin(1, `)
n→ ∗: EncKLcin`{IDa, τ,xc(1, `),yc(1, `)}{CellMateList}n,` ≡ φ
for all cell-mates do
ACK → a
if ACK is valid then
Update {CellMateList}n,`
end if
end for
KBS`a ← H(K‖IDa‖x`0‖y`0)
{LIST}a ← {xc(1, `),yc(1, `), {CellMateList}a,
KLcin`}
n→ BS`: EncKBS`a {LIST}a
end for
Ensure: KBS`a , {LIST}a, {CellMateList}a
After that, a hybrid scheme described in Chapter 3 is followed to govern the commu-
nication inside the WSN as:
• The cell-by-cell scheme is followed by each sensor node n during sending the message
{LIST}a to all BSs.
• The single hop scheme is followed by all BSs, that have a wide coverage, to corre-
spond with any sensor node n.
Each BS, denoted as BS`, follows the verification steps shown in Algorithm. 4.8 where
receiving a similar message from all nodes in a cell c via a different path indicates the
absence of any malicious node in that cell. However, both Algorithm-4 and Algorithm-5
might be implemented to revoke the detected suspicious node and cells in order to over-
come the resultant consequences. During its journey from the event cell to the BSs, each
message is authenticated by using the en-route-filtering scheme shown in Chapter 3. This
is implemented by each filtering cell di,` belonging to each cell c using the authentication
key K
di,`
c which is derived by the BS` as shown in Algorithm-4.8. The derivation of this
key by the BS helps to decrease the computation cost in contrast with other schemes
discussed in Chapter 5
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4.6 Report Generation
During the surveillance mission, each node create two types of report:
• Event report: this reports any event happening in the vicinity such as a moving
person or vehicle, human voice and temperature change. This report is generated
by the sensor node without any BS request and usually contains: cell ID, event
location, event occurrence time and event type. It is generated by all n sensor
nodes inside the cell c by making use of the signal strength strategy [115].
• Responding report: this is a report created as a response to a request sent by a
BS. It is generated by a particular sensor node or by the entire n nodes inside a
specific cell. such a report is used to establish routing schemes, authentication cells
dedication and revocation of suspected sensors and cells.
While this work focuses on the packet security regardless of the nature of its contents,
both reports will be referred to as an incident report < throughout the rest of this thesis.
In order to thwart outsider attackers, < is encrypted by KLc. However, these attackers
might be able to inject fake information or create bogus incidents. Therefore, a rigid
endorsement must be enclosed in the generated report. For the MS-LKMP, the following
conditions must be available in the incident report to be accepted as an authenticated
report:
• The received data from different nodes inside the cell of the event occurrence must
be unique.
• A generation of ε MAC generated by the authentication nodes.
• The availability of the cell reporters signature.
The fundamentals of the threshold linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [32] is used
to achieve the first condition where the unique cell-BS key is employed to calculate the
unique sensor node share <a of the encrypted incident report < = EKLC{<}:
<a = <
ε−1∑
ı=0
(KBS`a )
ı mod p, (4.1)
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each particular sensor node inside the cell c broadcasts its own share, as a tuble {<a, n}
to all sensor nodes in the cell. As a result, each node collects and then concatenates n−1
shares:
<Final = <1‖<2‖<n (4.2)
To achieve the second condition, multiple MACs are calculated over <Final by making
use of the authentication keys K
d(i,`)
c , which are calculated by the BS ` and broadcasted
to the authentication cell d(i,`) as shown in Algorithm-4.8. Based on these MACs, The en-
route filtering scheme [20] is achieved by each authentication cell. As an example, if two
authentication cells (d(1,3) and d(2,3)) are dedicating to the cell c by the third BS, denoted
as BS3, each node inside c disseminates following packet to the surrounding cell-mates:
MACKLc{<,MACKd(1,3)c (<Final),MACKd(2,3)c (<Final)} (4.3)
Thereafter, if the sensor node n receives i(n− 1) MACs (i: number of authentication
cells), n creates the synthesized incedent report which includes the ID list of all cell-mates,
the ID of the event cell <Final and i of MACs. Then, the random timer procedure [78] is
utilised to prevent any possible duplication in the generated incident report.
The third condition, which is the most important endorsement presented in MS-LKMP
,is the signature generated by the set of z cell reporters which are selected randomly (out
of the total n sensor nodes) by a BS or a set of BSs as will be discussed briefly in following
section.
4.7 Key Revocation
As shown in Algorithm-4.8, any suspicious node or cell is listed in the SusbNodes,
SubCells lists respectively. Such a node/cell has an ability to threaten the entire WSN
security. Therefore, this section presents two schemes proposed to revocate any element
that is identified as suspicious or compromised. These schemes are significantly important
in order to prevent any possible colluding between the suspicious elements. Accordingly,
89
4.7 Key Revocation
Algorithm 4.8 BS` verification of the {LIST}a packages sent by each node.
Require: {LIST}a : n = 1, 2..., N
COUNT = 0;SuspNodes ≡ φ
for n = 1, 2..., N do
BS extracts IDa from the header of {LIST}a
KBS`a ← H(K‖IDa‖x`0‖y`0)
Dec
K
BS`
a
{LIST}a = {xc(`),yc(`),
{CellMateList}a, KLcin`}
IDc = 10xc(`) + yc(`)
Num = Length{LIST}a
if {LIST}a ≡ {LIST}n−1 then
Num = Num+ 1
else
SuspNodes← n
end if
end for
if COUNT ≥ b0.5Numc+ 1 then
Call Algorithm(4)
else if COUNT < b0.5Numc+ 1 then
SuspCells← IDc
Call Algorithm(5)
else
KLc ≡ KLcin`
{LIST}c = {LIST}a ∪ IDa
BS` → n : EncKBS`a {KLc, {LIST}c}
if BS` ← n : ACK then
K
d(i,`)
c = H(KLc‖KLd(i,`)‖xd(i,`)‖yd(i,`)‖xc(`)‖yc(`))
BS` → n ∈ c : {d(i,`)} ∪ {Kd(i,`)c }
end if
end if
Ensure: KBS`a , SuspNodes, SuspCells,KLc, {LIST}c
, {d(i,`)}, {Kd(i,`)c }
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every BS BS` calls the Algorithm-4.9 to revoke the credentials of every sensor node
s ∈ SusbNodes. On the other hand, each BS BS` follows Algorithm-4.10 to revocated
each cell c ∈ SusbCells.
Algorithm 4.9 Revocation process implementation of the BS BS` for each suspicious
sensor node (n) ∈ SuspNodes of the cell (c) .
Require: IDn ∈ SusbNodes, IDc, KLc, Kdi,`c : i = 1, 2...t
{LIST}new = ∀IDn(IDn ∈ {LIST}c
∧
IDn 6= IDc)
KLc new ← H(xc(`)‖‖yc(`)ts‖{LIST}new)
K
di,`
c = H(KLc new‖KLdi,`‖(xdi,` , ydi,`)‖xc(`)‖yc(`))
for ∀n(n ∈ {LIST}new do
BS` → n : {KLc new, IDc, Kdi,`c : i = 1, 2...t}
end for
RemoveKBS`c
Ensure: {LIST}new, KLc new, Kdi,`c : i = 1, 2...t}
Algorithm 4.10 Revocation process implementation of the BS BS` for each suspicious
cell (c).
Require: IDc, KLc, K
di,`
c : i = 1, 2...t
Remove KBS`c
for ∀di,` : i = 1, 2...t do
Remove K
di,`
c }
end for
4.8 Security Analysis of LKMP-MBS
The main purpose of this Chapter is to analyse the security of LKMP-MBS and compare
it with the LKMP-SBS to investigate the feasibility of using multiple BSs in terms of
data security. On the same hand, MKMP-SBS is compared with the MKMP [21] based
on following aspects:
1. The role of both the number of cell reporters (z(`)), selected by each BS, and the
number of BSs (M) in the security of each particular cell.
2. The system rigidity in terms of wireless security requirements for data confidentiality
and authenticity.
The second point will be investigated using the likelihood of compromising the entire
WSN as a result of launching a Random Node Capture Attack (RNCA). This likelihood
is measured by the percentage of compromised cells and presented by a graph depicting
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the relationship between the total number of compromised nodes versus the percentage of
compromised cells. The outcome of the last point is the cornerstone of Section 4.9, which
investigates the optimum value of (z(`)).
4.8.1 Security Strength in Terms of Data Confidentiality
The contents of the incident report < generated inside a cell c is only revealable by the
sensor nodes located in that cell due to its encryption by the KLc. This guarantees
the data confidentiality even when a number of intermediate nodes are compromised.
However, if one of the nodes involved in report generation is compromised, the report
contents could be revealed. In order to investigate the security robustness of MS-LKMP
in terms of data confidentiality, the impact of the RNCA is investigated. The cell is
considered compromised if and only if:
1. The threshold number ε of nodes are compromised.
2. All the z(`) cell reporters, belonging to each particular BS, are compromised.
Accordingly, the expression of PC{ε|z} is derived for MS-LKMP as:
PC{ε|z} = (1− Pε{0})(1− Pz{0}) (4.4)
While the first condition is not related to the number of BSs or to z(`), the same
expression derived in Chapter 3 as (3.20) is followed to determine Pε{0} as:
Pε{0} =
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) (4.5)
The second term, Pz{0}, is analysed regarding each particular BS. This is achieved
for the `th BS by assuming that x nodes are compromised out of a total of N nodes in
the network, so the adversary has
(
N
x
)
methods to compromise x nodes. Additionally,
inside each cell there are
(
n
z(`)
)
different methods to create a report endorsed by whole cell
reporters. The total number of different methods to implement both processes is
(
N
x
)(
n
z(`)
)
.
Regarding the whole network, suppose j nodes out of z(`) cell reporters are compromised.
Then the adversary picks z(`) nodes randomly out of n sensor nodes, captures j nodes out
of the z(`) nodes participating in the report generation and then compromises (x− j) out
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of (N − z(`)) nodes as a final step. The resultant probability Pj of capturing j nodes out
of z(`) endorsement nodes is:
P
(`)
z{j} =
(
N
z(`)
)(
z(`)
j
)(
N−z(`)
x−j
)(
N
x
)(
N
z(`)
)
=
(
z(`)
j
)(
N−z(`)
x−j
)(
N
x
)
⇒ P (`)z{0} =
(
N−z(`)
x
)(
N
x
) (4.6)
Regarding only a single BS, BS(1), the probability of a particular cell to be compro-
mised is calculated as the probability of compromising all its cell reporter as: (1−P (`)z{j}).
As a result, the probability for a particular cell to be compromised by capturing all BSs’
cell reporters Pz is calculated as:
Pz = (1− P (1)z{0})(1− P (2)z{0}) · · · (1− P (`)z{0})
Seeking for simplicity, z(`) is assumed to be similar for all values of `, as a result:
PC{ε|z} =
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) ) M∏
`=1
(
1−
(
N−z(`)
x
)(
N
x
) ) (4.7)
This equation is one of the main findings of this Chapter where it is used to test the
robustness of LKMP-MBS in terms of data confidentiality in terms of different parameters.
Moreover, it is significantly used to determine the optimum number of cell reporters z(`)
as shown in Section 4.9. For different values of N , n and M , the percentage of captured
cells regarding data confidentiality in terms of the number of compromised nodes is shown
in Fig. 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. Figures are plotted based on simulation results collected
from the environment built by the Contiki OS Cooja simulator [127] and analysed by
MATLAB following Monte Carlo simulation concepts [128] which are perfectly match the
analytical results gained by using (4.7). These figures show that:
1. The security of LKMP-MBS in terms of data confidentiality, PC{ε|z} , is observed to
be proportional to the values of z.
2. LKMP-MBS outperforms MKMP for any value of (N ,ε and z).
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(e) ε = 20
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(f) ε = 24
Figure 4.4: Data confidentiality of LKMP-MBS and MKMP under random node capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 5, 000, z = 3 and for different values of ε.
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(b) ε = 8
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(d) ε = 16
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(e) ε = 20
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Figure 4.5: Data confidentiality of LKMP-MBS and MKMP under random node capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 10, 000, z = 3 and for different values of ε.
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Figure 4.6: Data confidentiality of LKMP-MBS and MKMP under random node capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 20, 000, z = 3 and for different values of ε.
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(f) ε = 24
Figure 4.7: Data confidentiality of LKMP-MBS and MKMP under random node capture
attack in a WSN consist of N = 30, 000, z = 3 and for different values of ε.
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The behaviour of the relationship between x and PC{ε|z} is the same for any value
of N and ε where PC{ε|z} is increasing as x increments. However, the curve slope varies
depending on N and ε. These differences are depicted in Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9 respectively.
The two figures showing that:
PC{ε|z} = f(
1
N
, ε) (4.8)
The following two sections discuss and explains the mathematical proof of (4.8).
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Figure 4.8: The effect of changing the number of nodes in the network N on the
probability of compromising all cells in terms of data confidentiality due to RNCA,
M = 4 ,ε = 10 and z = 5.
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Figure 4.9: The effect of changing the number of endorsement nodes in the network ε on
the probability of compromising all cells in terms of data confidentiality due to RNCA,
N = 10, 000, M = 4 and z = ε
2
.
• The effect of N on the value of PC{ε|z} in LKMP-MBS
As mentioned in Section 4.8, the ratio of compromised cells caused by implementing
the RNCA is the metric used to measure the robustness of the LKMP-MBS in
terms of data confidentiality. However, assuming the number of nodes in each
cell is constant, increasing N leads to increasing the number of total cells. As
a result, increasing the value of N decreases the ratio of compromised cells and
leads to improving the security of the system in terms of data confidentiality. The
mathematical proof of (4.8) is achieved from (4.7) as:
Proof 4.1
PC{ε|z} =
(
1−
(
N−ε
x
)(
N
x
) ) M∏
`=1
(
1−
(
N−z(`)
x
)(
N
x
) )
= P1P2
⇒ PC{ε|z} = f(P1, P2) (4.9)
Regarding (4.9), it is proved that P1 = f(
1
N
) in Chapter 3.
99
4.8 Security Analysis of LKMP-MBS
On the other hand :
P2 =
M∏
`=1
(
1−
(
N−z(`)
x
)(
N
x
) )
∵
(
1−
(
N−z(`)
x
)(
N
x
) ) > 0 for all `
∴ P2 ∝
(
1−
(
N−z(`)
x
)(
N
x
) )
P2 ∝
(
N
x
)(
N−z(`)
x
)
∝
N !
x!(N−x)!
(N−z(`))!
x!(N−z(`)−x)!
(4.10)
N !
x!(N − x)! ·
x!(N − z(`) − x)!
(N − z(`))! =
(N − z(`))!∏z(`)i=1(N − z(`) + i)(N − z(`) − x)!
(N − z(`))!(N − x− z(`))!∏x+z(`)i=1 (N − z(`) − x+ i)
=
∏z(`)
i=1(N − z(`) + i)∏x+z(`)
i=1 (N − z(`) − x+ i)
=
1∏x
i=1(N − x− z(`) + i)
for N, x and n ∈ N
=
1
Nx − a1Nx−1 + a2Nx−2 − · · · axN (4.11)
Where: b1, b2 · · · bx are constants in terms of N .
From both (4.10) and (4.11):
P2 = f(
1
N
)
⇒ PC{ε|z} = f( 1
N
) (4.12)

• The effect of ε on the value of PC{ε|z} in LKMP-MBS
There are two reasons for the relationship between ε and PC{ε|z}:
1. Increasing the number of endorsement nodes with keeping a constant value of
z(`) selected by each BS increase the likelihood of generating a fake report from
that cell.
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2. Increasing ε will need an increment in the value of n which leads to a decrease
in the number of cells in the WSN assuming the total number of nodes N in
the WSN is constant. Hence, the ratio of compromised cells is increased, which
reduces the security level of the system in terms of data confidentiality.
The same mathematical proof shown in 3.8.3.2 is considered while the ε- dependent
parts of both (3.21) and (4.7) are the same.
• The effect of z(`) on the value of PC{ε|z} in LKMP-MBS
In contrast to the LKMP-SBS, described in the previous Chapter, LKMP-MBS shows a
lower value of PC{ε|z} for all values of x. These values are varies based on the number of
cell reporters z(`) selected by each BS. This attitude is the same for variable N and ε. A
WSN consisting of N = 5, 000, n = 10 and M = 4, 6, 8 performance in terms of PC{ε|z} is
depicted in Fig. 4.10 where z = 1, 3, 5, 9:
It is obvious that the improvement in PC{ε|z} is proportional to the number of BSs.
This is due to the increment in the difficulty of compromising a particular cell when more
BSs are involved. For any adversary, it is crucial to compromise all z cell reporters selected
by all BSs rather than compromising one set of cell reporters as described in LKMP-SBS.
4.8.2 Security Strength in Terms of Data Authenticity
Inside any particular cell, data authenticity is compromised if the attacker succeeds in
capturing the threshold number of sensor nodes which allow him\ her to generate a fake
event report and send it to the BS(s). Once a message is received by any particular node,
it can be forwarded if that node has the ability to recover ε MAC addresses, as explained
in (4.2). In order to present our system robustness in terms of data authenticity, (4.15) is
derived using Bayes’ theorem [116] to calculate the probability of an event resulting from
two events:
• An event of compromising ε and send a bogus report signed by the whole ε nodes.
The probability of this event Pauth{ε} is calculated by assuming that x nodes are
compromised. Then, as the probability of a cell not affected has been derived in (4.5)
as: Pε{0} =
(N−εx )
(Nx)
the probability of generating a bogus report by ε compromised
sensor nodes then sending it to the BS(s) along with all credentials can by illustrated
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Figure 4.10: Comparison between LKMP-MBS and LKMP-SBS for different values of
M in terms of PC{ε|z} due to a RNCA in a WSN consisting of N = 5, 000, z = 1, 3, 5, 7
and n = Mz + 3.
as
Pauth{ε} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) (4.13)
• An event of sending a bogus report signed by the whole z(`) cell reporters selected
by all BSs. First of all, the probability of generating such a report signed by only
one BS’s cell reporters set, BS(1), is derived by following the same analysis of the
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previous point as:
P 1auth{z} =
z∑
j=1
(
z
j
)(
N−z
x−j
)(
N
x
) (4.14)
Accordingly, the probability Pauth{z} of sending a bogus report signed by all BSs’
cell reporters is calculated as:
Pauth{z} = P 1auth{z}P
2
auth{z} · · ·P (`)auth{z}
For simplicity, z(`) is assumed to be similar for all values of ` and as a result the
fraction of compromised cell caused by compromising x nodes in terms of data
authenticity is written as:
Pauth{e|z} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) M∏
`=1
z(`)∑
j=1
(
z(`)
j
)(
N−z(`)
x−j
)(
N
x
) (4.15)
For different values of N , n and z, the percentage of captured cells concerning data
authenticity in terms of the number of compromised nodes is shown in Fig. 4.11, 4.12,
4.13, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22. These figures show that:
1. The fraction of captured cells, measured as Pauth{ε|z}, increases with the number of
captured nodes.
2. Pauth{ε|z} is found to be proportional to the value of M . As a result, LKMP-MBS
shows a better performance in comparison to LKMP-SBS.
3. LKMP-MBS clearly outperforms MKMP in terms of data authenticity for all values
of x, M , N and n.
4. LKMP-MBS overcomes the shortage of LKMP-SBS related to the comparison with
the performance of LEDS. For all values of M > 2, LKMP-MBS outperforms LEDS
in terms of Pauth{ε|z}. However, only when M = 2, LKMP-MBS outperforms LEDS
when x exceeds a threshold value xt as reflected in Table. 4.1. It is obvious that
even when M = 2 LKMP-MBS show a significant improvement in terms of xt which
means that the usage of multiple BSs give better performance in comparison to
LEDS even when a lower number of nodes are compromised.
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Figure 4.11: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 10, 000, ε = 4 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.12: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 10, 000, ε = 6 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.13: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 10, 000, ε = 8 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.14: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 10, 000, ε = 10 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.15: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 20, 000, ε = 4 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.16: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 20, 000, ε = 6 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.17: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 20, 000, ε = 8 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.18: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 20, 000, ε = 10 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.19: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 30, 000, ε = 4 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.20: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 30, 000, ε = 6 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.21: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 30, 000, ε = 8 and z = 3.
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Figure 4.22: Data authenticity of LKMP-MBS (M = 2, 4, 6), LKMP-SBS, LEDS and
MKMP vesus a number of compromised nodes due to RNCA in a WSN of parameters
N = 30, 000, ε = 10 and z = 3.
It is obvious that, regardless of the value of M , the behaviour of the relationship
between x and Pauth{ε|z} is the same for any value of N and ε where Pauth{ε|z} increases
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Table 4.1: Comparison between LKMP-MBS and LKMP-SBS in terms of Xt.
N ε
Xt Improvement Percentage
LKMB-SBS z = 3 LKMB-MBS z = 3
10, 000
4 4875 2600 46.67%
6 5700 3600 36.84%
8 5825 3800 34.76%
10 5875 4000 31.91%
20, 000
4 9750 5200 46.67%
6 11050 7000 36.65%
8 11350 7600 33.04%
10 11500 7800 32.17%
30, 000
4 15500 8000 48.39%
6 17300 10600 38.73%
8 17400 11400 34.48%
10 17500 11800 32.57%
by x increases. However, the slope of the curve varies depending on N , M and ε values.
These differences are depicted in Fig. 4.23 and Fig. 4.24 respectively. The two figures
show that:
Pauth{ε|z} = f(
1
N
, ε) (4.16)
The following two sections discuss and explain the mathematical proof of (3.34) .
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Figure 4.23: The effect of changing the number of nodes in the network N on the
probability of compromising all cells in terms of data authenticity due to RNCA, ε = 10,
z = 3.
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Figure 4.24: The effect of changing the number of endorsement nodes in the network ε
on the Probability of compromising all cells in terms of data authenticity due to RNCA,
N = 10, 000, z = ε
2
.
• The effect of N on the value of Pauth{ε|z}
As mentioned in 4.8.1, any increment in the the value of N in a WSN increases the
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number of total cells assuming the number of nodes per cell is constant. Therefore,
increasing the value of N decreases the ratio of compromised cells and leads to
enhancing the security of the system in terms of data authenticity.
The mathematical proof of (4.16) is achieved, based on (4.15), as:
Proof 4.2
Pauth{e|z} =
ε∑
j=1
(
ε
j
)(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
) M∏
`=1
z(`)∑
j=1
(
z(`)
j
)(
N−z(`)
x−j
)(
N
x
)
= P1P2
⇒ Pauth{ε|z} = f(P1, P2) (4.17)
The term P1 is proved to be f(
1
N
) as shown in Chapter 3. ON the other hand, while(
ε
j
)
in (3.36) is a not depending on N , it is considered as a constant:
P1 ∝
ε∑
j=1
(
N−ε
x−j
)(
N
x
)
∝
ε∑
j=1
(N−ε)!
(x−j)!(N−ε−x+j)!
(N)!
x!(N−x)!
∝
ε∑
j=1
x!(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(x− j)!(N − ε− x+ j)!
∝
ε∑
j=1
(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(N − ε− x+ j)! (4.18)
ε∑
j=1
(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(N − ε− x+ j)! =
ε∑
j=1
∏ε−j
k=1(N − x− ε+ j + k)∏ε
k=1(N − ε+ k)
=
N ε−j − a1N ε−j−1 + a2N ε−j−2 − · · · aε−jN
N εx− a1N ε−j−1 + a2N ε−j−2 − · · · aεN
While (ε− j) < ε
ε∑
j=1
(N − ε)!(N − x)!
N !(N − ε− x+ j)! ∝
1
N
(4.19)
From both (4.18) and (4.19):
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P1 = f(
1
N
)
P2 = f(
1
N
)
⇒ Pauth{ε|z} = f( 1
N
) (4.20)

• The effect of ε on the value of Pauth{ε|z}
There are two reasons for the relationship between ε and Pauth{ε|z}:
1. Increasing the number of endorsement nodes and keeping a constant value of z
increases the likelihood of generating a fake report from that cell.
2. Increasing ε will increase the value of n which leads to a decrease in the number of
cells in the WSN assuming the total number of nodes N in the WSN is constant.
Hence, the ratio of compromised cells is increased which reduces the security level
of the system in terms of data confidentiality.
While the ε value dependant of the (4.15) is the same as the relevant part of (3.33),
the mathematical proof explained in 3.4 is considered here.
4.9 The Optimum Number of Cell Reporters
As illustrated previously, each BS BS` selects its own set of cell reporters z
(`) inside each
particular cell c. However, as illustrated in Section 4.2, there are two control topologies:
IndCon and ColCon. Accordingly, the selected set of cell reporters might have:
1. No mutual elements with any sets of cell reporters within the same cell in the case
of IndCon.
2. Some mutual elements with different sets of cell reporters within the same cell in
the case of ColCon.
In this section, the optimality of the number of cell reporters (z(`)) is investigated for
both cases.
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4.9.1 IndCon: Cell reporter sets having no mutual elements
In this situation, any particular node n could be a cell reporter selected by only one BS
in the network. Accordingly, the probability of compromising all cell reporters, selected
by the M BSs, out of the total n sensor nodes Pz comp can be calculated. The expression
of Pz comp varies based on the length z
(`) selected by each BS where there are two cases:
1. The length of the cell reporter set |z(`)| is the same for all BS`
2. The length of the cell reporter sets is not unified for all BSs.
• The length of the cell reporter set |z(`)| is the same for all BS`
In this case, it is considered that (|z(1)| = |z(2)| . . . = |z(M)| = z). Accordingly, the
calculation of Pz comp can be determined using the compromising strategy explained
in the following example:
Assuming a WSN with M = 2, z = 2 and n = 10, the adversary has:
– A probability of P1 =
2·2
10
= 4
10
to compromise all set reporters belonging to all
BSs in the first trial.
– A probability of P2 =
(2·2)−1
9
= 3
9
to compromise the remaining cell reporters
from the remaining 9 nodes in the 2nd trial.
– A probability of P3 =
(2·2)−2
8
= 2
8
to compromise the remaining cell reporters
from the remaining 8 nodes in the 3rd trial.
– probability of P4 =
(2·2)−3
7
= 1
7
to compromise the remaining cell reporters from
the remaining 7 nodes in the 4th trial.
Then the probability of compromising all cell reporters is calculated as:
Pz comp = P1P2P3P4 =
1
210
This can be generalised as:
Pz comp =
(
Mz
n
)(
(Mz)− 1
n− 1
)
· · ·
(
1
n− (Mz) + 1
)
Pz comp =
(Mz)!(n−Mz)!
n!
(4.21)
Hence, in order to estimate the optimum value of z, the minimum point of the
Pz comp is investigated:
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zopt = arg min
z
{
(Mz)!(n−Mz)!
n!
}
∂
∂z
(Mz)!(n−Mz)! = 0
(n−Mz)!Γ(Mz + 1)ψ0(Mz + 1) =
(Mz)!Γ(n−Mz + 1)ψ0(n−Mz + 1)
ψ0(Mz + 1) = ψ0(n−Mz + 1)
According to [118], ψm(x) is a monotonic function. Therefore:
k =
n
2M
(4.22)
The first derivative test is applied to test the critical point z shown in (4.22). This
is implemented by selecting two test points (z− = 0 ∈ (−∞, n
2M
)) and (z+ = n
M
∈
( n
2M
,∞)):
∂
∂z
(Pz comp) =
∂
∂z
(Mz)!(n−Mz)!
n!
=
1
n!
[(n−Mz)!Γ(Mz + 1)ψ0(Mz + 1)−
(Mz)!Γ(n−Mz + 1)ψ0(n−Mz + 1)] (4.23)
As a result, at z = z− = 0
∂
∂z
Pz comp(z = 0) =
n!Γ(1)ψ0(1)
n!
− Γ(n+ 1)ψ
0(n+ 1)]
n!
= ψ0(1)− ψ0(n+ 1) (4.24)
On the other hand, when z = z+ = n
M
:
∂
∂z
Pz comp(z =
n
M
) =
Γ(n+ 1)ψ0(n+ 1)
n!
− n!Γ(1)ψ
0(1)]
n!
=ψ0(n+ 1)− ψ0(1) (4.25)
The expression of ((4.24)) and ((4.25)) is shown to be negative, positive respectively
for all n ∈ R+ according to 3.2. Therefore, k = n
2M
is the unique minimum point
of Pz comp. Figure. 4.25 depicts this fact for (n = 20, 30 and 40).
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Figure 4.25: The relationship between the number of cell reporters (z) and the
probability of compromising all cell reporters (Pz comp) for a WSN with four BSs
(M = 4) when the number of sensor nodes inside each cell n = 20, 30 and 40.
• The length of the cell reporter sets is not unified for all BSs
Following up the strategy followed in the derivation of (4.21), the following equation
is derived to determine the probability of compromising all cell reporters Pz comp selected
by all M BSs in the network:
Pz comp =
(
∑M
`=1 |z(`)|)!(n− (
∑M
`=1 |z(`)|)!
n!
(4.26)
Hence, the optimum number of cell reporters is calculated as:
M∑
`=1
|z(`)opt| =
n
2M
(4.27)
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In such a case, if |z(i)| of any BSi is increased for any reason, |z(`)| of other BSs must
be deceased to keep the optimality conditions of (4.27). This will require a reliable real
time cooperation between all BSs and will negatively affect the security of those cells
having a lower number of cell reporters. As a result, this consideration will increase the
complexity of the system and affect its security balance where the same attacker, who fails
to compromise the cell reporters of one BS, has the ability to compromise cell reporters of
remaining BSs. Therefore, in the case of no mutual elements between several cell reporters
sets, choosing cell reporters sets of the same length for all BSs is better than choosing
them with different lengths.
4.9.2 ColCon: Some elements are mutual between different cell
reporter sets
In this case, each specific node n could be a cell reporter selected by more than one BS
in the network. It is obvious that taking such case into account will definitely complicate
the process of the probability calculation. However, the discussion of this assumption is
found to be crucial where it is more realistic due to:
1. Both the randomness and the secrecy of cell reporter selection increase the possibility
of this event occurring.
2. The possibility of losing some nodes because of a physical failure or security attack
might lead to secrecy in the number of nodes inside a particular cell.
3. The consideration of uniform node distribution is an ideal assumption and might
be altered by different conditions.
4. Some applications allocate more than one function for each particular cell in the
WSN. Hence, a particular node might be in charge of reporting more than one BS
at the same time and this increases the possibility of choosing that node as a cell
reporter for the mentioned BS.
For simplicity, the number of cell reporters selected by every BS is assumed to be
the same (|z(1)| = |z(2)| . . . = |z(M)| = z). Accordingly, the probability of compromising
all cell reporters in a row by an adversary Pz comp is calculated by considering a worst
case scenario where the adversary has full knowledge of M , z and n. The adversary’s
objective is to compromise all cell reporters. As mentioned earlier, there are M BSs in
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the WSN where each BS had selected z cell reporters, Therefore, the adversary’s aim is to
compromise Mz − zˆ cell reporters where zˆ refers to the number of mutual cell reporters
in the network. However, zˆ is assumed to be outside the adversary’s knowledge due to
its variance and unpredictability. Accordingly, the main purpose of the assumed attack
is to compromise Mz cell reporters among n nodes inside a particular cell. As a result,
this attack is considered to launch through Mz consecutive stages where one node is
compromised at each stage. Our target is to calculate Pz comp after launching this attack.
The main challenge of this problem is the change of z after each stage depending on the
previous stage. Therefore, a mathematical model of this system had been considered as
a Markov chain [129]. Accordingly a status matrix for our problem is manipulated as
shown in Table. 4.2. The following variables are illustrated in this matrix:
• Told represents the total number of non compromised nodes before implementing a
stage of attack.
• Tnew represents the total number of non compromised nodes after implementing a
stage of attack.
• Rold represents the total number of non compromised cell reporters before imple-
menting a stage of attack.
• Rnew represents the total number of non compromised cell reporters after imple-
menting a stage of attack.
Then each cell with index (i, j) in this matrix is filled by the value, based on the cell
indices of a transition matrix T which is derived to specify the transition between each
two consecutive stages as:
T (i, j) =
(
Rnew(i)
∆R(i,j)
)(
Mz−Rnew(i)
M−∆R(i,j)
)(
Mz
M
) (4.28)
Where:
∆R(i, j) = Rnew(i)−Rold(j)
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Finally, T is used to determine the probability of compromising all cell reporters in
the WSN after implementing Mz stages as [129]:
ω = νTMz (4.29)
Pz comp =
M+1∑
i=1
ω[i] (4.30)
Where:
ν = [0 0 · · · 1]
ω[i] is the ith column of ω.
While the main target is to calculate the probability of compromising all cell reporters
after the completion of the last stage.
The relationship between z and Pz comp is depicted in Fig. 4.26. It is obvious that
increasing the number of BS in the WSN leads to an increase in the value of Pz comp.
Moreover, this figure depicts the optimum value of z (zmin) that causes a minimum value
of Pz comp which is shown to be decreasing by increasing the number of BSs. The reason
behind the recorder results is due to the increment in the number of mutual cell reporters
which increases the probability if compromising more cell reporters.
4.10 Conclusion
In this Chapter, a novel multiple BS location-dependent key management protocol (LKMP-
MBS) is presented based on a randomly selected cell reporter scheme and is proven to
achieve better performance in comparison with existing schemes and with the (LKMP-
SBS) presented in the previous Chapter. The problem of the degraded performance of
LKMP-SBS in comparison with LEDS had been overcame in this scheme. An extensive
mathematical analysis was presented to evaluate this scheme in terms of system security
by considering data confidentiality, authenticity and overall robustness against attacks
targeting cell reporters. Both data confidentiality and authenticity have been proven to
be f(ε, 1
N
). Moreover, the system optimality in terms of the number of selected cell re-
porters has been analysed for different considerations. In the case of considering that all
cell reporters sets have no mutual elements, the optimum number of cell reporters had
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Table 4.2: Status matrix of the Markov module
Rold ↓ Tnew=0 · · · Tnew=nM
Rnew → 0 1 · · · Mz · · · 0 1 · · · Mz
Told=0
0 · · ·
1 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Mz · · ·
Told=M
0 · · ·
1 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Mz · · ·
Told=2M
0 · · ·
1 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Mz · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
Told=nM
0 · · ·
1 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Mz · · ·
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Figure 4.26: The relationship between the number of cell reporters (z) and the
probability of compromising all cell reporters (Pz comp) inside a a particular cell for
different numbers of BS (M = 1, 2, 3).
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been calculated as zopt =
n
2M
,
∑M
`=1 |z(`)opt| =
n
2M
when they have unified and not unified
lengths respectively. On the other hand, if these sets are considered to have a mutual file
between them, a mathematical model is built bases on Markov chain analysis and the zopt
is found to be varying according to the M value.
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Chapter 5
MELKMP-MBS: Protocol
Description and Communication
Overhead Analysis
5.1 Introduction
As described in both of Chapter 3 and 4, each node in the network has an ability to
perform all required functions based on the credentials derived according to its location
within the hosting cell. This guarantees the node service availability while it is located
within the area of its hosting cell. However, the availability is significantly altered when a
node or a group of nodes move between different cells, increasing the likelihood that they
will be treated as an adversary in the new hosting cell after movement. Therefore, this
chapter proposes the Mobility Enable Location Dependant Key Management Protocol
for Multiple Base Stations (MELKMP-MBS) as an improvement to the LKMP-MBS,
which has the disadvantage of not supporting node mobility. Dynamic WSNs, which may
contain some mobile nodes, could be easily managed by this protocol by achieving several
types of handover strategies to keep the availability of a mobile node when it is moving
between two (or more) zones inside the WSN. As a key contribution of this chapter, the
communication overhead is analysed extensively for MELKMP-MBS in order to estimate
the impact of handover processes using an extensive mathematical analysis and simulation
results obtained by MATLAB and Contiki simulator. Following the same methodology,
communication overhead of both LKMP-SBS, LKMP-MBS are presented and compared.
On the other hand, the security evaluation of this protocol is omitted in this chapter while
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it is similar to the analysis of LKMP-MBS presented in previous chapter.
5.2 Nodes Mobility between different BS coverage
regions
As explained in Chapter 4 , the topology of a multiple BS WSN is classified into:
• Individual control (IndCon)
• Collaborative control (ColCon)
Accordingly, there is a high possibility for a mobile node in WSN to traverse between two
ore more cells that are covered by different BSs. Therefore, a Mobility Enabled Location
Dependent Key Management Protocol for a Multiple Base Station WSNs (MELKMP-
MBS) is presented in this section as a novel key management scheme includes all the
facilities required to govern the mobility of sensor nodes between different cells (Cold and
Cnew) in order to handle a smooth handover between the two BSs, hereafter known as
BSold and BSnew. Moreover, such a protocol has an ability to implement the required
processes of adding/removing new nodes which are significantly crucial in dynamic net-
works. Regardless of the control topology of the network, there are two types of handover
as shown in Fig. 5.1:
1. local handover: when a node is moving between two cells belonging to the same BS.
For example, a local handover is implemented by the BSold in the case of node A
mobility from its Cold = 1 to Cnew = 2.
2. global handover: when a node is moving between two regions each one belongs to
a different BS. For example, a global handover is implemented by BS1 and BS2 in
the case of node B mobility from its Cold = 5 to Cnew = 9.
As shown in the previous chapters, both LKMP-SBS and LKMP-MBS consist of three
phases: Setup phase, Report Generation Phase and Key Revocation Phase. On
the other hand, MELKMP-MBS consists of four phases:
1. Setup phase
2. Report Generation Phase
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Figure 5.1: A 16 cell WSN controlled collaboratively by two BSs, i.e., BS1 and BS2.
3. Handover phase
4. Key Revocation Phase
Both the 2nd and 4th phases are the same as those used in LKMP-MBS and described
by Algorithms.4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. On the other hand, the remaining two new phases are
illustrated in the following sections.
5.3 Setup Phase
In this protocol, each node (a) is preloaded with the following parameters:{K, IDa, IDma ,
∆, p, t,S} Where:
IDma : Node mobility identity that is used to identify itself to the Cnew, this ID is preloaded
as well as IDa to all BSs.
Based on their locations, the preloaded S and the value of τ , each particular node deter-
mines:
• Its cell centre location using Theorem 3.1.
• The set of adjacent cells
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Cadj =

C1adj
C2adj
.
.
.
CMadj

Where:
Ciadj ={(xic − 1, yic + 1), (xic, yic + 1), (xic + 1, yic + 1), (xic − 1, yic), (xic + 1, yic),
(xic − 1, yic − 1), (xic, yic − 1), (xic + 1, yic − 1)} (5.1)
In addition, the matrix of initial cell keys KLcin is derived by all nodes in the cell c
as shown in Algorithm. 5.11.
Algorithm 5.11 Security credentials derivation by each particular node during setup
phase
Require: K,S, τ,∆, (xs, ys)
Kτ ← K‖τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
xa−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
ya−S2
∆
⌉
for i=1:M do
Cadj ←

C1adj
C2adj
.
.
.
CMadj

end for
KLcin ←

H(Kτ‖xc(1)‖yc(1))
H(Kτ‖xc(2)‖yc(2))
.
.
H(Kτ‖xc(M)‖yc(M))

Ensure: Kτ , (xc, yc),KLcin,Cadj
Then, each sensor node inside a cell c discovers and creates a list of its cell-mates
as described in Algorithm. 4.7 shown in the previous chapter. Finally, the verification
procedure for the received report is implemented following similar steps to Algorithm.
4.8.
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5.3.1 Handover Phase
This section explains the procedure of implementing both the local and global handover
explained previously. The main purpose is to guarantee the service availability of the
mobile node or at least maintain a minimum time of its unavailability. Such a procedure
has to be as secure as possible in order to prevent any vulnerability caused by inside or
outside attackers, such as the node clone attack and node replication attack in both static
and mobile WSNs [130–133].
5.3.1.1 Local handover
In the case of a node mobility between two cells belonging to the same BS, it is crucial
to report that movement to different entities in the WSN such as:
• The BS: in order to consider this node as a legitimate node by updating the hosting
cell of this node.
• The entire set of nodes in Cold: In order to update the e value and overcome the
criticality of considering the mobile node as a node which does not record that event,
hereafter know as a ”Dereporter Node”.
• The whole node within Cnew: In order to legitimize the new node as a ”Reporter
Node” and update the value of e.
In order to sketch a handover process based on the above requirements, the local handover
can be further classified based on node mobility into:
• Intended mobility: where a node is moving to its Cnew based on a BS request,
according to a pre sketched plan or by a self decision. In such a type of mobility,
the node has an opportunity to send a message indicating its movement, its target
and the time of movement occurrence as illustrated in Algorithm. 5.12.
• Non-intended mobility: where a node is forced to be moved to a new region due to
external effects such as weather conditions. In this case, the node has no enough
time to alert other entities such as the BS, Cnew and Cnew nodes. This type of
handover is illustrated in Algorithm. 5.13.
It is obvious that the second class, Non-intended mobility, is the worst case scenario and
needs to be addressed efficiently by MELKMP-MBS. Figure. 5.2 illustrate the message
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sequence chart of the intended mobility local handover. On the other hand, the message
sequence chart of the Non-intended mobility local handover is depicted in Fig. 5.3.
Algorithm 5.12 Intended local handover procedure followed when a node a is moved from
Cnew to Cold, both are belonging to BSold
Require: K, IDa, ID
m
a , (xCnew , yCnew), (xCold , yCold),MovT ime,S, K
BSold
a , , τ
a→ ∗ (Cold): EncKLc(old)ImMoving(IDa, IDma , (xCnew , yCnew),MovT ime)
for all cell-mates (α) do
α→ BSold: EncKBSoldα MovingNode(IDa, ID
m
a , (xCnew , yCnew),MovT ime)
end for
BSold → Cold EncKLc(old)Ack(Akn)
BSold → a EncKBS(old)a {Akn,KLc(temp)}
BSold → Cnew EncKLc(new)AddNew(IDa, IDma ,MovT ime,KLc(temp))
a→ ∗ (Cnew): EncKLc(temp)Hello(IDa, IDma , (xCnew , yCnew),MovT ime)
Cnew → a EncKLc(temp)Ack(τ)
for Cnew ∪ a do
Kτ ← K‖τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
x−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
y−S2
∆
⌉
KMLc(new2) ←

H(Kτ‖xc(1)‖yc(1))
H(Kτ‖xc(2)‖yc(2))
.
.
H(Kτ‖xc(M)‖yc(M))

end for
Cnew → BSold EncKLc(new)NewCellKey((xc,yc), {CellMateList}, KoldLc(new2))
BSold → CBSold EncKLc(old)MovedNode(IDa, IDma ,MovT ime)
Ensure: KLc(temp) , K
old
Lc(new2)
Algorithm 5.13 Non-intended local handover procedure followed when a node a is moved
from Cnew to Cold , both are belonging to BSold
Require: K, IDa, ID
m
a ,MovT ime,S, K
BSold
a , , τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
x−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
y−S2
∆
⌉
a→ ∗ (Cnew): EncK Hello(IDa, IDma , (xCnew ,yCnew),MovT ime)
Cnew → BSold EncKLc(new)NewNode((xc,yc), IDa, IDma )
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BSold → Cnew EncKLc(new)Ack(KLc(temp))
BSold → a EncKBS(old)a Ack(KLc(temp))
Cnew → a EncKLc(temp)Ack(τ)
for Cnew ∪ a do
Kτ ← K‖τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
x−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
y−S2
∆
⌉
KMLc(new2) ←

H(Kτ‖xc(1)‖yc(1))
H(Kτ‖xc(2)‖yc(2))
.
.
H(Kτ‖xc(M)‖yc(M))

end for
Cnew → BSold EncKLc(new)NewCellKey((xc,yc), {CellMateList}, KoldLc(new2))
BSold → Cold EncKLc(old)MovedNode(IDa, IDma ,MovT ime)
Ensure: (xCnew , yCnew), KLc(temp) , K
BSold
Lc(new2)
5.3.1.2 Global handover
In the case of node mobility between two cells belonging to different BSs, it is crucial to
report this movement to different entities in the WSN:
• The BS (BSold) covers its original cell (Cold): in order to remove this node’s creden-
tials from its database to:
– Thwart attackers from cloning identity of the mobile node.
– Prevent the mobile node from encrypt/decrypt messages to/from nodes of
(Cold).
• The entire set of nodes in Cold: In order to update the e value and overcome the
criticality of considering the mobile node as a node which does not record that event,
hereafter know as a ”Dereporter Node”.
• The BS (BSnew) covers its destination cell (Cnew) : in order to legitimize the new
node and to generate the required credentials.
• The whole node within Cnew: In order to legitimize the new node as a ”Reporter
Node” and update the value of e.
To achieve the global handover process, three means of communication are used:
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1. BS-BS communication via a Backbone link between each of the two BSs such as:
fibre optic, terrestrial and satellite microwave.
2. One hop communication between the BS and remote cells as mentioned in Chapter
1 and Chapter 3.
3. cell-by-cell communication between the mobile node and the BS.
As same as local handover, global handover can be classified into: Intended and Non-
intended, as shown in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 respectively. Moreover, both classes are
illustrated by Algorithm. 5.14 and Algorithm. 5.15.
Algorithm 5.14 Intended global handover procedure followed when a node a is moved
from BSold coverage area to BSnew coverage area
Require: K, IDa, ID
m
a , (xCnew , yCnew), (xCold , yCold),MovT ime,S, K
BSold
a , τ
a→ ∗ (Cold): EncKLc(old)ImMoving(IDa, IDma , (xCnew , yCnew),MovT ime)
for all cell-mates (α) do
α→ BSold: EncKLc(old)MovingNode(IDa, IDma , (xCnew , yCnew),MovT ime)
end for
BSold → Cold EncKLc(old){Akn}
BSold → a EncKBS(old)a Akn(KLc(temp) , K
BSnew(temp)
a )
BSold → BSnew EncKBSnewBSold AddNode(IDa, ID
m
a ,MovT ime,K
BSnew(temp)
a )
BSnew → Cnew EncKLc(new)AddNode(IDa, IDma , KLc(temp))
BSnew → a Enc
K
BSnew(temp)
a
Ack(IDa, ID
m
a , KLc(temp))
a→ ∗ (Cnew): EncKLc(temp)Hello(IDa, IDma , (xCnew ,yCnew),MovT ime)
Cnew → BSnew EncKLc(new)NewNode((xc,yc), IDa, IDma , )
Cnew → a EncKLc(temp)Ack(τ)
for Cnew ∪ a do
Kτ ← K‖τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
x−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
y−S2
∆
⌉
KMLc(new2) ←

H(Kτ‖xc(1)‖yc(1))
H(Kτ‖xc(2)‖yc(2))
.
.
H(Kτ‖xc(M)‖yc(M))

end for
Cnew → BSnew EncKLc(new)NewCellKey((xc,yc), {CellMateList}, KLc(new2))
KBSnewa ← H(K‖IDa‖xnew0 ‖ynew0 )
BSnew → BSold EncKBSoldBSnewAck(IDa, ID
m
a ,MovT ime)
BSold → Cold EncKLc(old)MovedNode(IDa, BSnew, Cnew)
Ensure: KLc(temp) , K
BSnew(temp)
a , KLc(new2)
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Algorithm 5.15 Non-intended global handover procedure followed when a node a is moved
from BSold coverage area to BSnew coverage area
Require: K, IDa, ID
m
a , (xCnew , yCnew), (xCold , yCold),MovT ime,S, K
BSold
a , τ
a→ ∗ (Cnew): EncK Hello(IDa, IDma , (xCnew ,yCnew),MovT ime)
Cnew → BSnew EncKLc(new)NewNode((xc,yc), IDa, IDma ,MovT ime)
BSnew → BSold EncKBSoldBSnewNewNode(IDa, ID
m
a ,MovT ime)
BSold → BSnew EncKBSnewBSold NodeKeys(IDa, K
BSold
a )
BSnew → Cnew EncKLc(new)Ack(IDa, IDma ,MovT ime,KLc(temp))
BSnew → a EncKBSolda Ack(IDa, ID
m
a ,MovT ime,KLc(temp) , K
BSnew(temp)
a )
for Cnew ∪ a do
Kτ ← K‖τ
xc ← 0.5
⌈
x−S1
∆
⌉
,yc ← 0.5
⌈
y−S2
∆
⌉
KMLc(new2) ←

H(Kτ‖xc(1)‖yc(1))
H(Kτ‖xc(2)‖yc(2))
.
.
H(Kτ‖xc(M)‖yc(M))

end for
Cnew → BSnew EncKLc(new)NewCellKey((xc,yc), {CellMateList}, KLc(new2))
KBSnewa ← H(K‖IDa‖xnew0 ‖ynew0 )
BSnew → BSold EncKBSoldBSnewAck(IDa, ID
m
a ,MovT ime)
BSold → Cold EncKLc(old)MovedNode(IDa, BSnew, Cnew)
Ensure: KLc(temp) , K
BSnew(temp)
a , KLc(new2)
5.4 Communication overhead
In order to assess the proposed protocols, the number of messages disseminated through
the network, which is defined as ”communication overhead”, is investigated mathe-
matically and then measured based on a simulation environment built using the Contiki
OS Cooja simulator [127] and MATLAB. For all key management schemes, the served re-
gion by the WSN is assumed to be a square terrain of size A where N nodes are uniformly
distributed around the terrain as shown in Fig. 5.6. Because of the uniform distribution,
the number of nodes deployed on each side of the terrain is considered to be (≈ √N).
The size of each packet constituting the generated report, acknowledgement message and
bootstrapping correspondences are assumed to be of a fixed size (λ) Bytes. As described
previously, LKMP-SBS, LKMP-MBS and ELKMP-MBS are sharing three main phases:
Setup, Report Generation and Key Revocation. In this section, the communication over-
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Figure 5.2: Message sequence chart of the intended mobility local handover.
Figure 5.3: Message sequence chart of the Non-intended mobility local handover.
head caused by the 1st and the 2nd phases is considered while the communication cost of
the revocation phase will be analysed in a separate section.
As a new terminology, NodalDistance is introduced to express the distance between
any two point or regions in a WSN defined as:
• In traditional protocols: The approximate number of nodes lying in a straight line
between two zones.
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Figure 5.4: Message sequence chart of the intended mobility global handover followed
when a node a is moved from BSold coverage area to BSnew coverage area .
Figure 5.5: Message sequence chart of the Non-intended mobility global handover
followed when a node a is moved from BSold coverage area to BSnew coverage area.
• LKMP-SBS, LKMP-MBS and MELKMP-MBS: The approximate number of cells
lying in a straight line between two zones.
For the traditional protocols such as MKMP [21] and LEDS [20], all nodes constituting
the NodalDistance between two nodes A and B are participating in message delivery
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between them using a node by node communication in the worst case scenario. Hence, in
the square terrain constituting of N nodes, where (≈ √N) nodes are lying on each side,
the longest NodalDistance is its diameter (≈ √2N).
On the other hand, all cells constituting the NodalDistance between two zones A and B
are participating in message delivery between them using a cell by cell communication in
the proposed schemes. Hence, in the square terrain constituting of N nodes, where (≈√
N
n
) nodes are lying on each side, the longest NodalDistance is its diameter (≈
√
2N
n
).
Therefore, as a worst case scenario where the originating cell (Corg) is located in one
corner while the related BS is located in an opposite corner, the communication overhead
is calculated as a summation of the following items :
• Setup Phase:
1. CCset: Communication cost of transmitting the setup phase messages from the
(Corg) to BS.
2. CCset Ack: Communication cost of acknowledging (Corg) by the BS.
• Report Generation Phase:
3. CCRep Req: Communication cost of requesting a report from the (Corg) by the
BS.
4. CCRep Gen: Communication cost of creating a report inside the (Corg).
5. CCRep Send: Communication cost of sending the generated report from the
(Corg) to the BS.
5.4.1 MELKMP-MBS
The calculation of MELKMP-MBS communication overhead is based on two main pa-
rameters:
1. Implementation of the setup phase and report generation phase: CCset, CCset Ack,
CCRep Req CCRep Gen and CCRep Send.
2. Mobility communication cost CCmobility, which is related to overhead implementa-
tion, in case of a node mobility.
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: Sink
: Sensor Node
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
Sink2
Sink1
Sink3
Figure 5.6: A square terrain of size A divided into 100 cells and covered by a WSN
consists of N = 300 where each side contains w
√
300.
As a result, the entire communication overhead might be expressed as:
CCMELKMP−MBS = ĈCMELKMP−MBS + CCmobility (5.2)
Where the derivition of both terms is described briefly in following sections
5.4.1.1 Communication Overhead of Setup Phase and Report Generation
Phase
First of all, during the setup phase, each node a out of the n nodes inside Corg sends its
{LIST}a as described in Algorithm 4.7. Due to the uniform distribution, every node has
a similar number of cell-mates and accordingly the communication cost of this phase is
nλ which is the number of messages generated by the Corg. However, this message will be
re-sent by each cell alongside the NodalDistance which has a very long distance in the
worst case scenario. The length of NodalDistance is ≫ n for MELKMP-MBS, LEDS
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and MKMP. As a result, the communication cost of the setup phase is (CCset '
√
2N
n
λ),
(CCset '
√
2Nλ) for MELKMP-MBS, MKKMP/LEDS respectively. On the other hand,
the communication cost related to all BS acknowledgements is λ in MELKMP-MBS due
to the single node communication pattern followed in the BS-cell communication. In
contrast, it is (' √2Nλ) in LEDS/MKMP due to the node to node communication
pattern followed there.
Secondly, all mentioned protocols are sharing the same process of event report generation
by a particular cell where all n nodes are participating. As a result, the communication
cost of report generation is CCRep Gen ' nλ. However, these protocols differ in the
value of CCRep Req where it is CCRep Req ' λ, CCRep Req '
√
2Nλ for MELKMP-MBS,
LKMP/LEDS respectively due to the difference in communication pattern followed to
achieve the BS-cell communication. Also, CCRep Send '
√
2N
n
λ, CCRep Send '
√
2Nλ for
the MELKMP-MBS, LKMP/LEDS respectively due to the difference in communication
pattern followed to achieve the Cell-BS communication. The communication cost patterns
are illustrated in Table. 5.1 and accordingly, the entire communication cost, for each
protocol, is expressed as:
ĈCMELKMP−MBS = λ(2
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 2) (5.3)
CCLEDS = λ(4
√
2N + n) (5.4)
CCMKMP = λM(4
√
2N + n) (5.5)
Table 5.1: Communication cost analysis for LEDS/MKMP and LKMP-SBS
Communication Cost
pattern(CC)
MKMP/LEDS MELKMP-MBS
CCset
√
2Nλ
√
2N
n
λ
CCset Ack
√
2Nλ λ
CCRep Req
√
2Nλ λ
CCRep Gen nλ nλ
CCRep Send
√
2Nλ
√
2N
n
λ
Moreover, according to [134]:
CCSODD = Nλ+
4N√
n
λ+ kmnι+ kc(mλ+ d)
√
2N (5.6)
CCTTDD = kmNλ+ kcd
√
N (5.7)
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Where, based on the system specifications shown in [21, 134], k is the number of BSs, m
is the number of cells traversed by each mobile BS, 0 ≤ c ≤√2 and d is the number of
data packets received from a particular cell. To be consistent, a single stationary BS is
assumed (k,m = 1) for TTDD and SODD. Also, (M = 1) is considered for the MKMP.
Therefore, it is reflected by the same graph of LEDS.
5.4.1.2 Communication Overhead of Node Mobility
In this section, the derivation of CCmobility, which is related to overhead implementation
in the case of a node mobility, is presented. As described in Section. 5.3.1, a set of
messages is disseminated through the network between the mobile node and its cell mate
in Cold, cell mates in Cnew, BSold and BSnew according to the mobility nature and the
implemented handover. The communication overhead caused by these actions is affected
mainly by following parameters:
1. Node speed υ and mobility duration t.
2. Number of mobile nodes.
3. Number and the type of occurred handover.
As a worst case scenario, m nodes are considered to be moving inside a WSN coverage
area where each node is travelling at a speed of υ m/s . Regarding this mobility, the related
BS (BSold or BSnew) is located at the farthest distance away from both of Cold and Cnew
where: NodalDistance =
√
2N
n
. The node trajectory is considered to be traversing as
much cells as possible. Therefore, mobile nodes are assumed to pass through each cell
via the shortest path which is the ”cell side = λ” in case of square cells. As a result, a
mobile node is passing through υt
λ
cells during its movement. Hence, there are υt
λ
local
handovers occurred during this journey. However, it is crucial to determine the number
of global handovers when a node is moving from one BS coverage to another BS coverage
area. Therefore, a new term Cellular Area (CA) is defined as:
The number of cells inside a WSN coverage area”
Assuming that the cellular area is divided adequately between all BSs, CA of the `th BS
is:
CA` =
N
′
M
=
N
nM
(5.8)
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Accordingly, the number of cells that are visited by a mobile node (r) until it reaches
the coverage area of an adjacent BS can be estimated based on the shape of BS coverage
area as shown in Fig. 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 to be:
r =

√
N
nM
Square coverage√
N
pinM
Circular coverage√
N
2
√
3nM
Hexagonal coverage
(5.9)
It is obvious that, regardless of the assumed shape of BS coverage, a global handover
occurs after traversing r cells by the mobile nodes. As a result, the approximate number
of global handovers is:
GH(t) =
⌊ υt
∆r
⌋
(5.10)
On the other hand, the approximate number of local handovers is:
LH(t) =
υt
∆
−
⌊ υt
∆r
⌋
(5.11)
Hence, CCmobility as a function of time is illustrated as:
CCmobility(t) = GH(t)× CCGH + LH(t)× CCLH (5.12)
Where:
CCGH : Communication cost of global handover. CCLH : Communication cost of local
handover.
CCGH and CCLH are calculated according to their message sequence chart shown in
Fig.5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 as:
Assume that each message sent during the handover process, discussed in Section. 5.3.1,
has a length of λ following a consideration of:
• The cost of each report sent from a cell to a BS is (n − 1)λ × NodalDistance
because it is generated by all nodes except the mobile node and forwarded through
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Figure 5.7: Node mobility in a square terrain consist of N nodes, N
′
= N
n
cells and
covered by 4 BS each one has a square coverage.
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Figure 5.8: Node mobility in a square terrain consist of N nodes, N
′
= N
n
cells and
covered by 4 BS each one has a circular coverage.
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Figure 5.9: Node mobility in a square terrain consist of N nodes, N
′
= N
n
cells and
covered by 4 BS each one has a hexagonal coverage.
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NodalDistance of nodes/cells.
• The cost of each report sent from a cell to the mobile node is (n− 1)λ.
In contrast, messages between BSs are assumed to be of length Λ. Therefore:
CCLH (Intended Mobility ) = 5λ+ (n− 1)λ+ 3(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
= λ
[
3(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 4
]
(5.13)
CCLH (Non-Intended Mobility ) = 4λ+ (n− 1)λ+ 2(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
= λ
[
2(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 3
]
(5.14)
CCGH (Intended Mobility ) = 7λ+ (n− 1)λ+ 3(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
+ 2Λ
= λ
[
3(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 6
]
+ 2Λ (5.15)
CCGH (Non-Intended Mobility ) = 4λ+ 2(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
+ 3Λ
= λ
[
2(n− 1)
√
2
N
n
+ 4
]
+ 3Λ (5.16)
The main target is to analyse the communication overhead inside the WSN caused by
using MELKMP-MBS, therefore, Λ is considered to be zero while the BS-BS communica-
tion is implemented via a different link and has no overhead in the network. As a result, a
simulation is implemented and the recorded CCmobility is depicted in Fig. 5.11, Fig. 5.12
and Fig. 5.13.
It is obvious from (5.2), (5.12), (5.13), (5.14), (5.15), (5.16) that:
CCmobility  ĈCMELKMP−MBS (5.17)
Based on simulation results and above equations, this overhead has following relationships
with the other network parameters:
1. CCmobility ∝ 1r : Where increasing the radius of BS coverage will reduce the number
of global handovers and, as a result, decrease the value of GH(t) at a particular
moment. However, this requires physical modification in the BS structure and
increases the power cost. In addition, any modification to BS coverage specification
will contravene the control topology of the WSN.
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Figure 5.10: Comparison between communication cost of ELKMP-MBS for different
values of n,N .
2. CCmobility ∝ υ ∝ t: This obviously happens when the number of visited cells by
a fast mobile node is greater than that visited by a slower mobile node. Also, the
same mobile node is visiting more cells when the travelling duration is increased. In
our simulation, the average speed of a walking human 1.2m/s [135] is considered.
3. CCmobility ∝ n: This is proved by simulation results as shown in Fig. 5.10. The
reason behind this is the increment in the messages created by the nodes inside Cold
and Cnew during the implementation of local and global handover.
4. CCmobility ∝ N : The increment in the value of N increases the number of cells and
leads to a significant increment in local handover occurrence.
5.4.2 LKMP-SBS
The communication overhead of LKMP-SBS is illustrated using the same analysis of
the previous sections where only the communication overhead of implementing the setup
phase and report generation phase are considered with M = 1:
CCLKMP−SBS = λ(2
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 2) (5.18)
For different values of n, LKMP-SBS, MKMP, LEDS, SODD and TTDD are simulated
as shown in Fig. 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.21.
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(f) n = 60,M = 8
Figure 5.11: Communication overhead vs. N for MELKMP-MBS, SODD and TTDD
(Circular BS coverage, intended mobility, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.12: Communication overhead vs. N for MELKMP-MBS, SODD and TTDD
(Hexagonal BS coverage, intended mobility, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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(a) n = 20,M = 4
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(b) n = 20,M = 8
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(c) n = 40,M = 4
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(d) n = 40,M = 8
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(e) n = 60,M = 4
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(f) n = 60,M = 8
Figure 5.13: Communication overhead vs. N for MELKMP-MBS, SODD and TTDD
(Square BS coverage, intended mobility, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.14: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 2, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
101
102
103
104
105
Number of nodes in the network
N
um
be
r o
f d
iss
em
in
at
ed
 p
ac
ke
ts
 
 
LEDS/MKMNP
SODD
TTDD
LKMP−SBS
Figure 5.15: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 5, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.16: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 10, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.17: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 20, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.18: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 40, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.19: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 60, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.20: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 80, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.21: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS, LEDS/MKMP, TODD and SODD
(n = 100, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.22: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS versus the number of total nodes in the
network (N) for different number of nodes inside each cell (n = (100, 60, 40, 10, 2)).
It is obvious from those figures that n has a direct impact on the communication
overhead. Therefore, the LKMP-SBS had been simulated by using different values of n
to understand its impact on the total communication overhead as shown in Fig. 5.22.
It is obvious that neither decreasing n nor increasing it will decrease the communication
overhead in the WSN. Therefore, a mathematical analysis is implemented in order to find
the optimum value of n that gives the minimum overhead.
5.4.2.1 Optimum value of n
The LKMP-SBS is simulated using the Contiki OS Cooja simulator in order to sim-
ulate the number of messages disseminated through a WSN consisting of 2000 sensor
nodes and covering an area of 1000 × 1000 m2 divided into N ′ cells where each cell
consists of n nodes. The value of n is changed from 0 to 100 for values of N =
10, 000, 30, 000, 50, 000, 70, 000, 90, 000 and the simulation is repeated, the number of mes-
sages disseminated is measured 1000 times in order to obtain the most accurate results
following Monte Carlo simulation concepts [128]. The analysed data is presented in Fig.
5.23,
It is obvious that optimum values of n that reflect a minimum level of communi-
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Figure 5.23: Communication cost of LKMP-SBS vs. the number of nodes inside each
cell n for N = 10, 000, 30, 000, 50, 000, 70, 000, 90, 000.
cation overhead are varied according to N , which are 27, 39, 39, 46, 52, 56 when N =
10000, 30000, 50000, 70000, 90000 respectively. Therefore, further mathematical analysis
is required to investigate the relationship between n, N and the communication over-
head. Accordingly, the optimum value of n which leads to decrease the communication
overhead is determined given that N is a constant. Finding this is significantly crucial
in order to allow the network operator to design the grid in an optimum way in terms of
communication overhead regardless of the area of the monitored region. As mentioned in
5.18:
CCLKMP−SBS = λ(2
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 2)
In order to investigate the optimality of n, CCLKMP−SBS is derived in terms of n, then
∂
∂n
CCLKMP−SBS is equalled to zero to determine its critical points:
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∂
∂n
CCLKMP−SBS = λ(1−
√
2nN
n2
)
= 0
⇒ n = 3
√
2N is a critical point
In order to investigate whether the determined critical point is a local minima or a
local maxima, a second derivative method is followed. Accordingly:
∂2
∂n2
CCLKMP−SBS = λ(
3N
n2
√
2nN
)
∂2
∂n2
CCLKMP−SBS|n= 3√2N = λ
3N
( 3
√
2N)2
√
2N 3
√
2N
(5.19)
While N, n ∈ N+, above term is positive for all values of N and n = b 3√2N + 0.5c is a
local minima. For the five values of N used in the simulation, the mathematical analysis
shows similar values as shown in Table. 5.2
Table 5.2: Simulation vs. Mathematical results of the optimum n in terms of
communication overhead
N Simulation Result (n = 3
√
2N)
Mathematical Model Result
(n = b 3√2N + 0.5c)
10,000 27 27.144 27
30,000 39 39.148 39
50,000 46 46.415 46
70,000 52 51.924 52
90,000 56 56.462 56
152
5.4 Communication overhead
5.4.3 LKMP-MBS
To calculate the overall communication cost of LKMP-MBS, the same analysis of the last
section is followed to derive the communication cost where M cells are individually:
1. Implementing the setup phase.
2. Generating reports.
3. Sending the generated report to a relevant BS which is located in the farthest
destination.
Doing so, the worst case scenario is represented to study the communication overhead
using the LKMP-MBS. The communication cost of each particular route is the same as
that explained in (5.18), as a result:
Due to the consideration of a square terrain and the entire nodes normal distribution,
the entire communication cost of LKMP-MBS is expressed as:
CCLKMP−MBS = λM(2
√
2
N
n
+ n+ 2) (5.20)
On the other hand, the communication cost of MKMP is calculated using (5.5) derived
previously where number of BS is more than 1
CCMKMP = λM(4
√
2N + n) M 6= 1 (5.21)
LKMP-MBS, MKMP, TTDD SODD are simulated and the communication overhead
is presented versus the total number of nodes N for different values of M as shown in Fig.
5.24, 5.25, 5.26 and 5.27.
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(a) n = 2
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(b) n = 5
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(c) n = 20
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(d) n = 60
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(e) n = 100
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(f) n = 120
Figure 5.24: Communication overhead vs. N for LKMP-MBS, MKMP, SODD and
TTDD (M = 2, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Table 5.3: Reduction in computational overhead ∆P vs. N , t
N t ∆P (µJ)
100
4 17.7
8 5.9
12 5.9
250
4 29.5
8 11.8
12 5.9
500
4 41.3
8 17.7
12 11.8
1000
4 64.9
8 29.5
12 17.7
It is obvious that the relationship between communication overhead and N has the
same behaviour for different values of M,n where the overhead caused by using LKMP-
MBS is always less than that of the other schemes. However, it is varying according to
the number of BSs where it is obvious from (5.20) that CCLKMP−MBS = f(M) as shown
in Fig. 5.28. In addition, according to the same equation (5.20) and the analysis shown
in section 5.4.2.1 the optimum value of n = 3
√
2N .
5.5 Computational cost
In contrast to LEDS and MKMP, the security credential derivation and virtual grid con-
struction of LKMP-SBS, LKMP-MBS and MELKMP-MBS are facilitated by the assump-
tion of BS’s wide coverage presented in Chapter 1. This allow the BS to implement the
mentioned derivation rather than their implementation by each particular node. In con-
trast, in the MKMP scheme, the authentication keys shared with the relevant authenti-
cation nodes are derived individually by each node. On the other hand, these derivations
are implemented by a robot in LEDS which is an impractical assumption, especially in a
harsh environment. Hence, less computation is required to be implemented by each node
when employing our schemes. According to [136], power consumption of hashing 1 byte
by Mica2 is 5.9µJ in case of employing SHA-1. In the worst case scenario presented in 5.4,
NodalDistance between the event cell and the BS is
√
2N . In addition, the number of
report authentication cell alongside the authentication route is t. As a result, the amount
of reduction in computational overhead ∆P by using our proposed schemes is illustrated
in Table. 5.3 for different network parameters.
155
5.5 Computational cost
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
100
101
102
103
104
105
Number of nodes in the network N
N
um
be
r 
of
 d
iss
em
in
at
ed
 p
ac
ke
ts
 
 
MKMP
SODD
TTDD
LKMP−MBS
(a) n = 2
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(b) n = 5
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(c) n = 20
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(d) n = 60
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(e) n = 100
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(f) n = 120
Figure 5.25: Communication overhead vs. N for LKMP-MBS, MKMP, SODD and
TTDD (M = 4, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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(a) n = 2
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(b) n = 5
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(c) n = 20
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(d) n = 60
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(e) n = 100
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(f) n = 120
Figure 5.26: Communication overhead vs. N for LKMP-MBS, MKMP, SODD and
TTDD (M = 6, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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(a) n = 2
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(b) n = 5
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(c) n = 20
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(d) n = 60
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(e) n = 100
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(f) n = 120
Figure 5.27: Communication overhead vs. N for LKMP-MBS, MKMP, SODD and
TTDD (M = 8, d = 100 packet, λ = 1 packet).
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Figure 5.28: Communication cost of LKMP-MBS for different values of M = 2, 4, 6, 8.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel Mobility-Enabled Location-dependent Key Management Pro-
tocol for multiple BSs (MELKMP-MBS) was presented to overcome the limitation of
LKMP-MBS in supporting a WSN that contains moile node(s). In the same way as other
presented protocols, this protocol was based on a randomly selected cell reporter scheme.
The possible control schemes of a WSN by multiple BSs was discussed. Accordingly, dif-
ferent possible handovers are presented based on the nature of mobility between different
WSN zones controlled by different BSs. Data security was briefly discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, but the main focus of this chapter was on the communication overhead of
MELKMP-MBS. This protocol was proven to achieve lower communication overhead in
comparison with existing schemes. A thorough analysis for the potential communication
overhead in a WSN governed by a location dependent key management was presented.
In addition, the presented mathematical model was validated by a simulation environ-
ment for both LKMP-SBS and LKMP-MBS. Accordingly, the communication overhead
of MELKMP-MBS was presented by considering all possible handover procedures. Fur-
thermore, the optimality of WSN design such as the value of N, n was investigated in
terms of communication overhead in all protocols and it was shown that the optimum
number of nodes in each cell, which cause the minimum communication overhead in the
network , was n = 3
√
2N .
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
Due to its resilience against several types of attacks and security threats, location-dependant
key management schemes have gained a significant amount of attention recently. This
was facilitated by emerging technologies in location positioning which miniaturise GPS
circuitry and decrease their cost in terms of power budget and price. This thesis presented
the most critical open issues in employing location-dependent key management schemes.
Accordingly, it presents novel methods to address the highlighted problems.
In Chapter. 1, a general introduction to WSN was presented along with the chal-
lenges facing data security inside these types of networks. In addition, the definition of
cell reporter, as a main paradigm, was presented. Moreover, the motivation and thesis
contribution are shown. Finally, this chapter illustrates the outcome of this thesis as a
list of author publications.
In Chapter. 2, WSN background and security primitives are explained. In addition, a
brief history of key management schemes and En-Route filtering was presented showing
the evaluation metrics, the development of these schemes and their popular taxonomy.
Furthermore, WSN integration with the Internet, its challenges and solutions are intro-
duced. Finally a brief description to routing attacks are presented.
In Chapter. 3, a novel Location-Dependent Key Management Protocol for a Single
Base Station (LKMP-SBS) was presented to address the problem of weaknesses in both
confidentiality and authenticity in recent location-dependent key management schemes.
The virtual division of WSN terrain into N square cells was introduced in this chapter.
Accordingly, any event report generated inside each particular cell is endorsed by three
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entities where one of these entities is the set of cell reporters. This system is analysed
and proved to outperform recent schemes in terms of data security requirements. As an
instance, data confidentiality of LKMP-SBS outperforms other schemes by 95%, 90% and
85% if the cell-reporter set is selected to be z = 1, 2, 3 when 1000 nodes are compromised.
This is due to the ability of the adversary to disclose event contents in the case of com-
promising one of the e endorsement nodes in other schemes (MKMP and LEDS), whereas
in the proposed new scheme, the data is disclosed if and only if the entire set of z cell
reporters and all e endorsement nodes are captured. On the other hand, the improve-
ment drops to 75%, 57% and 43% when the number of compromised nodes is increased
to 5000 due to the increment in the probability of compromising the entire set of cell
reporters when more nodes are compromised. Furthermore, in terms of data authentic-
ity an enhancement of 49%, 24%, 12.5% was gained using the proposed approach with
z = 1, 2, 3 respectively when half of all nodes were compromised. However, LKMP-SBS
shows an improvement in comparison to LEDS only for higher values of x. Hence, it
outperform LEDS when x ≥ 4000, x ≥ 7000, x ≥ 10000 and z = 1, 2, 3 respectively. As
a result, LKMP-SBS is superior compared to the other schemes in terms of the fraction
of compromised cells caused by RNCA thwarting data authenticity, especially when 50%
of the nodes are captured. Finally, an extensive mathematical analysis was performed to
investigate the effect of network characteristics on both of confidentiality PC{e|z} and au-
thenticity Pauth{e|z}. It is proved that both values are ∝ 1N ∝ e. In addition, the optimum
number of cell reporters was extensively investigated in terms of the security requirements
and was proven to be z =
n
2
.
In Chapter. 4, a novel multiple BS location-dependent key management protocol
(LKMP-MBS) was presented based on a randomly selected cell reporter scheme and was
proven to achieve better performance in comparison with existing schemes and with the
LKMP-SBS presented in Chapter 3. The problem of the degraded performance of LKMP-
SBS in comparison with LEDS had been overcame in this scheme. An extensive math-
ematical analysis was presented to evaluate this scheme in terms of system security by
considering data confidentiality, authenticity and overall robustness against attacks tar-
geting cell reporters. Both data confidentiality and authenticity have been proven to be
∝ e ∝ 1
N
. Moreover, the system optimality in terms of the number of selected cell re-
porters has been analysed for different considerations. In the case of all cell reporters sets
having no mutual elements, the optimum number of cell reporters had been calculated as
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zopt =
n
2M
,
∑M
`=1 |z(`)opt| =
n
2M
when they have unified and not unified lengths respectively.
On the other hand, if these sets are considered to have mutual elements, a mathematical
model is built base on Markov chain analysis and the zopt is found to be ∝ 1M where
increasing the number of mutual cell reporters increases the probability of compromising
more cell reporters inside each particular cell.
In Chapter. 5, a novel Mobility-Enabled Location-dependent Key Management Proto-
col for multiple BS (MELKMP-MBS) was presented to overcome the limitation of LKMP-
MBS in supporting a WSN that contains mobile node(s). As with the other presented
protocols, this protocol is based on a randomly selected cell reporter scheme. The possible
control schemes of a WSN by multiple BSs is discussed. Accordingly, different possible
handovers were presented based on the nature of mobility between different WSN zones
controlled by different BSs. While The data security is briefly discussed in the previous
chapter, the main focus of this chapter is on the communication overhead of MELKMP-
MBS. This protocol is proven to achieve lower communication overhead in comparison
with existing schemes. A thorough analysis for the potential communication overhead in a
WSN governed by a location dependent key management was presented. In addition, the
presented mathematical model is validated by a simulation environment for both LKMP-
SBS and LKMP-MBS. Accordingly, the communication overhead of MELKMP-MBS was
presented by considering all possible handover procedures. Furthermore, the optimality
of the WSN design such as the value of N, n was investigated in terms of communication
overhead in all protocols and it was shown that the optimum number of nodes in each cell,
which cause the minimum communication overhead in the network , is n = 3
√
2N . The
reduction in power consumption due to adoption of our scheme is calculated and shown
to be a subject of N and t values where it si proved to be varying between 5.9(µJ) to
64.9(µJ) when (N = 100, t = 12), (N = 1000, t = 4) respectively. It is obvious that using
the proposed scheme will definitely increase the life cycle of the sensor nodes where the
computation cost is balanced between these nodes and the corresponding BS. According
to [136], sending one byte requires 59.2(µJ), therefore LKMP-SBS consumes (3.328mJ)
in total for packets dissemination inside a network consists of N = 10, 000, n = 27.
6.2 Future Work
Widespread research on location-dependent key management schemes and the promising
performance of using cell-reporters in these schemes confirm their suitability to be used
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as a rigid system to secure data inside a WSN. Nevertheless, there are still open problems
for different aspects such as location accuracy, security threats, data availability, network
construction and resource allocation. It is difficult to cover all theses aspects and address
all relevant system challenges in one thesis. Some of the proposed ideas that can be
considered as future work are divided into following categories:
• Location accuracy: Indoor localisation accuracy has emerged as one of the hottest
research areas recently. The Geographical Positioning System (GPS) lacks an ability
to be used indoor. Therefore, signalling from multiple BS can be used to detect node
position rather than using GPS.
• lightweight credentials
Investigate the possibility of using physical Uncloneable Function (PUF) [137, 138]
facilities to generate rigid, lightweight and scalable security credentials.
• Timing synchronisation
Digital clock drift is a major risks to data accuracy and availability. In addition such
a drift might lead to a significant impact on data security where attackers can make
use of this drift to create malicious reports or to drop genuine reports. Therefore,
a time synchronisation protocol assisted by cell reporters is worthy to be developed
in future.
• Data consistency: One of the major problems facing the usage of multiple BSs
is the data consistency, especially when each node is related to multiple BSs at the
same time. Therefore, one proposed future work is to build a system to maintain
on-line data consistency between BSs.
• Security of BS: In most recent schemes, BSs are considered as a secure network
entity due to their unlimited resources and being established in secure regions. It
is worthy to build a security scheme that thwarts any external attacks targeting
BSs. Such a scheme has to have an ability to detect and revoke a malicious BS.
A promising ideas inspired by random selected reporters might be considered as a
future work. It builds on comparing random selected data generated by more than
one BS as a final report regarding a particular region and decides whether one of
these BSs is forging data or not. Figure. 6.1 illustrate a general block diagram of the
scheme which is in implementation phase. As shown, all credentials are synchronised
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between different BSs and the decision maker is a council of threshold number of
BSs.
Figure 6.1: BS performance monitoring system
• Optimum BS location
Investigating the optimum BS(s) position(s) inside the network is worth investi-
gating. The optimality could be studied in terms of data security, overall network
traffic, the accuracy of malicious entities detection and time taken to implement
required revocation.
• Data Aggregation
Recent data aggregation schemes are challenged by:
– Collection of different data format in multi-purpose WSNs.
– Forwarding data to multiple BS WSNs.
– Handling mobile nodes’ generated data.
Therefore, an investigation into these challenges to innovate a novel scheme capable
of addressing these problems should be carried out.
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